



Redistricting Commissions, Gerrymandering, and Their Effects




Matt Grossmann


**MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY**

Institute for Public Policy
and Social Research
Michigan Political Leadership Program


Gerrymandering



50 PRECINCTS
60% BLUE
40% RED




5 DISTRICTS
5 BLUE
0 RED
BLUE WINS




5 DISTRICTS
3 RED
2 BLUE
RED WINS


A Michigan Seats to Votes Curve



Efficiency Gaps (Disproportionate Wasted Votes) Measure Partisan Effects




- Partisan Control is Associated with Efficiency Gaps
- Michigan had seen pro-Republican redistricting of ~2 US House seats
- But won in 2018




**Party Control =
Redistricting
Advantage**

**Used to Benefit
Democrats, Now
Republicans**


1942 – 1960




1962 – 1980



1982 – 2000




2002 – 2018



Unclear Effects of Commissions

May Reduce
Pro-Republican
Gerrymanders




Independent Commissions

- Do not increase confidence in redistricting process. It's about whether you like the party in power.
- Draw more compact districts that split fewer localities. Commissioners retain more boundaries.
- May not avoid partisan advantage (3/7 commissions AZ, NJ, VA still had)

Party Packing by Commission Type

<i>Commission Type</i>	<i>Membership</i>
Independent	
Arizona	5 members: not recent politician, 4 political selections & 5 th by those 4
California	14 members: not recent politician, pool of 60 names (20R, 20D, 20Indy), political leaders exclude 8 → 8 selected at random & those 8 select 6
Idaho	6 members: not current politician, D&R party leaders selected all 6
Washington	5 members: not recent politician, D&R leaders select 2 each, and those 4 select a nonvoting Chair
Advisory	
Iowa	Legislative Service Agency (civil servants) guided by 5 member commission with 1 each by the Majority and Minority leaders and those 4 select the 5 th
Maine	15 members: 6 each by party leaders, the 12 select 2 and those 2 select the 15 th
New York	6 members: 4 state legislators, 2 not legislators with 1 by Senate leaders and 1 by Assembly leaders
Rhode Island	18 members: 8 legislators by Majority leaders, 4 legislators by Minority leaders, and six not legislators by Majority leaders
Virginia	11 members: 5D and 5R by the Governor and those 10 select an independent
Politician	
Hawaii	9 members: Majority and Minority leaders select 4 each, those 8 select 9 th
New Jersey	13 members: Majority and Minority leaders each select 4, state party chairs select 2 each, and those 12 select a 13 th
Backup	
Connecticut	9 members: Majority and minority leaders in each legislative house select 2 each, those 8 select 9 th
Indiana	5 members: speaker of the house, president pro tem of the senate, the chairman of the house and senate committees on legislative apportionment, and a fifth member appointed by the governor from the membership of the general assembly



Advice Ignored in VA, Excepted in IA
Majority worked in WA, Not in AZ


Commission Variation

Commission Type	Charges
Independent	
Arizona ⁶	Contiguous, compact, preserve communities of interest, use visible geographic features (city, town, county, and undivided census tracts). Competitiveness is secondary. Party registration and voting records may not be used in the initial phase but later to check if goals are achieved. Cannot consider candidate homes.
California	Contiguous and preserve communities of interest. Compactness is secondary. Cannot consider candidate homes.
Idaho	Contiguous and preserve counties – if a county is split across districts, must be connected by a state or federal highway. Districts should preserve communities of interest and voting precincts.
Washington	Contiguous, compact, and convenient. Should follow natural, geographic, artificial, or political subdivision boundaries. Cannot favor or discriminate against any particular party or group. Should preserve communities of interest. Commission should “provide fair and effective representation and encourage electoral competition.”
Advisory	
Iowa	Contiguous and preserve the boundaries of other political subdivisions. Compact as long as consistent with higher order principles – regular polygons, length-width, and perimeter standards. May not use incumbent addresses, previous election results, or demographic data other than population headcount.
Maine	Compact and contiguous. Cross fewest political subdivisions as possible.
New York	Contiguous and as compact “as practicable” and take into account the “historic and traditional significance of counties.”
Rhode Island	Compact, should reflect natural, historical, geographical, and municipal and other political lines. Fair representation and equal access to the political process. Attempt to avoid dividing state Senate districts into congressional districts if it would result in a voting district of 100 or fewer voters.
Virginia	Contiguous and compact (Constitution); communities of interest – economic, social, cultural, geographic features, governmental jurisdictions and service delivery areas, political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations (commission); protect political subdivisions, counties, cities, and communities of interest as much as possible (governor)
Politician	
Hawaii	Contiguous, compact, and follow permanent and easily recognized features. Should also preserve communities of interest – defined specifically as socioeconomic. Districts cannot favor persons or political factions.
New Jersey	Contiguous and compact. Municipalities must also be kept intact. Conflicting judicial precedent on using incumbent residence.
Backup	
Connecticut	Activates if general assembly fails to adopt a plan by Sept. 15 of year after decennial census. Boundaries must be consistent with federal constitutional standards. State Assembly and Senate districts shall be contiguous; assembly districts should not divide towns.
Indiana	Activates if general assembly adjourns without adopting a plan or if the state finds itself without a valid congressional district law. Constitution requires assembly districts are contiguous. No guidelines for Congressional lines, although Indiana code provides specific details for resolution of inconsistent inclusions and geographic slivers in Congressional districts.


No Charge to Avoid Partisan Gerrymandering

Commission Type	Decision Procedures
Independent	
Arizona	Draft map advertised for 30 days to the public. Both chambers may make recommendations to the commission during this period. 3/5 commission votes required for final map.
California	Open public meetings around state. 9 commission votes – 3 Dems, 3 Rep, 3 neither – required. Final map approved by public referendum.
Idaho	Open public meetings around state. 2/3 commission votes required for final map within 90 days after commission is formed.
Washington	Open public meetings distributed via interactive webcast. Three voting members of commission required for final map. If commission fails, state supreme court creates plan. Legislature may amend proposed plan by 2/3 majority vote in both chambers within 30 days of submission.
Advisory	
Iowa	The Legislative Services Agency (LSA) works with commission to advise legislature. Must publicize plan and data and hold three hearings around state. Plan, data, and public feedback presented to legislature to be accepted or rejected without modification. If rejected, second plan presented. If second plan rejected, a third and final set presented, which may be modified at the legislature’s discretion.
Maine	Public hearings prior to submission. The legislature shall enact the submitted plan of the commission or a plan of its own by a 2/3 majority vote by June 11. Plan subject to gubernatorial veto. If no plan is approved by June 11, state supreme court shall consider plans and public briefs to create plan.
New York	Legislative task force on demographic research and apportionment, with approval of its co-chairmen, recommends a plan to the state legislature. Legislature may accept, reject, or modify plans, which are subject to gubernatorial veto.
Rhode Island	Commission sets its own rules of procedure. Must conform to Open Meeting and Access to Public Records laws. Makes recommendation to state legislature, which approves as a regular statute that is subject to gubernatorial veto.
Virginia	Commission may create own plan or accept one from the public. Submit to both chambers of the legislature, which may accept, reject, or modify plans. Bill subject to gubernatorial veto.
Politician	
Hawaii	Public hearings around state; at least 1 on each island. Majority of commission votes required for final map within 150 days after commission is formed.
New Jersey	Three public hearings around state. Should review maps submitted by citizens if time allows. Majority commission votes required for final map in open meeting. Otherwise, two highest voted plans go to state Supreme Court.
Backup	
Connecticut	5/9 votes for final map by Nov. 13. Upon delivery to Secretary of State, it is published and have the full force of law. If the commission fails to deliver a map by Nov. 13, the state Supreme Court has jurisdiction and ability to file a map.
Indiana	Majority (3/5) votes for final map within 30 days of assembly adjournment. Upon delivery to Governor, the plan put into effect by executive order.

Democrats Now Concentrated in Cities



Rural–Urban Difference in Rep. PID Advantage



Current Democratic Disadvantage

- Democrats Leading Charge to Reform in Republican States; But Some Trending Democratic
- Based Partially on Geographic Concentration in Cities; Easier for Republicans to Gerrymander
- Can't Always Predict, Especially Late in Cycle (2018)