The Electoral Size and Support of Michigan's Black and MENA Populations in 2024

INFORMING THE DEBATE

Michigan Applied Public Policy Research Brief

Funded by the 2024 MAPPR Grant Program

Institute for Public Policy
and Social Research
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, College of Social Science (IPPSR)
Michigan Applied Public Policy Research

The Electoral Size and Support of Michigan's Black and MENA Populations in 2024

Nura Sediqe, Corwin Smidt, and Meghan Wilson
Michigan State University
November 2025

Summary

Michigan's Black and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) residents comprise two of the state's more distinctive minority populations. But knowledge of each group's size and electoral support in Michigan remains scattered.

This study on the electoral support of minority populations in Michigan was funded by the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University (MSU) to combine census and voterfile data to identify and survey these two minority populations. We present our estimates of each group's relative size and party support in the 2024 Michigan general election.

For the 2024 Michigan November election, we estimate that Black voters declined in 2024. Black voters accounted for about 11.5% of all Michigan voters, compared to nearly 12% in 2020. MENA voters comprised about 1.9%, which was a substantial increase over our estimate of 1.4% in 2020 and closer to the size of Hispanic (2.9%) or Asian (2.2%) voters in Michigan.

Black support for the Democratic party in Michigan remained consistently strong and uniform in Black-heavy precincts. Precincts with over 80% Black voters supported Democratic statewide candidates over Republicans at a rate of 92-94%, which is only slightly lower than the 94-95% levels observed in 2020 in similar precincts.

But objections to the Biden administration's policies towards Gaza and Israel made party support much more variable for MENA voters. Precincts with high concentrations of MENA voters were less likely to vote for Harris for President, partly because rates of third-party voting were much higher. In the 35 precincts with the highest composition of MENA voters, Harris only won 33% of the two-party vote, but Slotkin won 43% and Democratic State Board of Education candidates won 49%. Rates of third-party voting for President was over 30% in these precincts, but only around 6.7% for the Senate. In 2020, high MENA precincts supported Democrats over Republicans at a 77% rate and only 1% voted third party.

Regression estimates indicate that if patterns of MENA precinct support for presidential voting mirrored the patterns of support for either Senate or State Board of Education elections, then Harris would have received about 34,000 more votes and reduced Trump's 80,103 vote margin in the 2024 presidential election. If MENA support in 2024 replicated 2020 support, then Harris would have gained over 70,000 votes and election would have been a near tie.

The following report discusses the political context of these two groups entering the 2024 election, our methods for identifying them, our estimates of the geography of Michigan's minority voters and how they voted, and our estimates of how much of an effect disaffected MENA voters had on the 2024 presidential vote in Michigan.

Minority Coalitions, the 2024 Presidential Election, Protest Voting

For minority voters, group-specific interests matter more than may be expected (Sanchez 2008). Whereas election forecasters emphasize the role of economics in predicting vote change, the policy priorities of minority communities, shaped by unique sociopolitical histories in the United States, underscore the need to integrate external sociopolitical factors into their forecasting models for greater accuracy.

MENA Voters and the Protest Vote

The state of Michigan has arguably the most politically engaged MENA population, with members of the community serving in city council (e.g., Hamtramck city council), as state legislators (e.g., Abraham Aiyash), and serving as one of the few elected members of U.S. Congress (e.g., Rashida Tlaib) (Curtis, 2024; Shryock, 2002). While MENA voters have historically held limited political power, the growing movement of grassroots campaigns is turning the tide.

This is exemplified in Michigan's Listen to Michigan Campaign and the state's Uncommitted Movement. This movement, spearheaded by two Arab Americans, Abbas Alawieh and Layla Elabed, worked off a small budget to advance a social movement strategy that championed protest votes in opposition to establishment Democrats' foreign policy stance toward Israel and the escalated civilian casualties in Gaza. In Michigan's February 27, 2024 Democratic primary, over 101,000 voters selected "uncommitted" on their ballots as part of a protest vote, roughly 13.2% statewide. Their stated goal—to amplify demands for a permanent Gaza ceasefire and an arms embargo—was met and exceeded, translating into two pledged delegates.

The protest votes reflected surveyed sentiment during this time as well. Gaza remained the top policy issue for 71% of surveyed American Muslims in summer 2024, and 68.5% of surveyed Middle Eastern voters stated that it was their main concern in the upcoming national election (Mogahed 2024; Hasan-Aslih et al, 2025).

Black Voters and Possible Discontent

The political behavior of Black voters during Michigan's 2024 elections was also in doubt although for different reasons. Black voters are extraordinarily partisan but are becoming subtly disengaged and disenchanted with partisan politics. Past studies illustrate that shared perceptions of group interests (Dawson 1994) and group social pressures to stay loyal to the Democratic party (White and Laird 2020) have maintained current loyalties, but these social pressures can also lead to declines in mobilization. They are perceived as a captured constituency, costing them to be ignored by both major parties. And Black political unity often masks important intra-group tensions, particularly around generation, class, and ideology (Cohen 1999), that can demobilize as well.

These dynamics were evident leading up to the 2024 election. With Trump as its nominee, the Republican party had made significant inroads across minority voters (Paz 2024). And, despite Harris becoming the Democratic Party nominee, high-quality polls suggested a possible 10-point decline in Black voter support, especially among men (King, Wiesman, and Igielnik 2024). In further evidence that these concerns were real, the Harris campaign developed and deployed campaign advertisements in October of 2024 specifically targeting young black men in Detroit and Philadelphia (Lerer 2024). Even if there is a slight erosion in Democratic support, these trends likely reflect emerging fault lines, as younger Black voters question whether unwavering Democratic loyalty serves their interests effectively.

Identifying the Ethnic and Racial Composition of Michigan's Voters in 2024

Michigan is distinct from other states, especially in the Midwest, for the size of its Black and MENA residents. The Census estimates that over 1.4 million of Michigan's 10 million residents are Black alone and that over 250,000 are MENA alone, and over 310,000 are MENA alone or in combination.

Both Black and MENA communities, constitute crucial voting blocs in Michigan, and unlike Hispanic or Asian populations, they are geographically concentrated. According to the US Census, Wayne County contains the highest concentration of both groups, 37.5% Black residents and 7.8% MENA residents. This makes Wayne County not only significant within Michigan but also the county with the largest MENA population in the entire United States. When including neighboring counties, Oakland and Macomb, more than 800,000 Black people and over 240,000 MENA people reside here.[1]

But, unlike Census population estimates, our ability to understand the electoral size and impact of these groups is much harder. Unlike southern states with high concentrations of Black voters, Michigan does not fall under federal VRA requirements to record the race of registered voters. We know what areas in Michigan have concentrations of minority groups, but we lack voting records that identify the race or ethnicity of the voter. Most surveys and studies rely on the Census's Current Population Survey November supplement to decipher turnout rates for presidential and midterm elections. But this estimate has a few core problems: 1) it has a large margin of error for minority subgroups;[2] 2) it is only available as a statewide estimate; 3) it suffers from over-estimate of turnout bias once corrected for missing error (Hur and Achen 2013, Bauman 2018); and 4) it shows much larger errors for minority turnout (Ansolabehere, Fraga, and Schaffner 2022). In short, it provides a poor glimpse of the relative prevalence of minority voters in the state. Even when looking at only the broadest estimates, like the overall vote count, the estimates have also failed to come close to Michigan results recently. In 2020, the CPS survey estimated 4.994 million voters in Michigan, but Michigan had over 5.579 million voters. Note that most political polls weigh their racial composition results to match these (inaccurate) estimates.

MENA estimates are even more of an unknown compared to other racial or ethnic minorities. Unlike Hispanics, MENA ethnicities are rarely identified in surveys or government records separately from race. The Census has classified most MENA ethnicities as white for over 100 years, so they often get coded similarly in surveys for weighting purposes. As a result, we have much less data on how they behave politically as a group. Survey organizations also copy the Census's categorization for weighting purposes and rarely allow for a more refined ethnicity estimate. The US Census published its first MENA population estimate following the 2020 census, but this was specific to a MENA count among those who self-identify as white (Marks, Jacobs, and Coritz 2023). But even those counts include some inclusions that may obscure its political relevance, such as Israeli or Kurdish.

Estimating Voter Race and Ethnicity using Location, Surnames, and the Census's 2020 MENA classification

Since the Census turnout data is both likely inaccurate and limited in its categorizations, we sought to estimate the race and ethnicity of all of Michigan's registered voters based on the person's residential address and name.

Survey researchers across public health and political science have developed methods to make these estimates with reasonable accuracy and precision (e.g., Elliot et al. 2008, Khanna and Imai 2016). We, likewise, use the popular *wru* program (Khanna et al., 2024) to estimate whether each Michigan voter

[1] Black population estimates are Census estimates for 2024 for the Black alone population (https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/oaklandcountymichigan,macombcountymichigan,waynecountymichigan,MI,US/RHI225224#qf-headnote-a). MENA estimates are based on the Census Middle Eastern coding of the 2020 write-in responses for the white racial category (https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2023/09/2020-census-dhc-a-mena-population.html).

[2] For example, the 2020 CPS estimate of the Black vote in Michigan ranges between 11.4 and 13.8% of voter turnout.

was likely White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or belonging to another category based on their residential address and last name.

Our innovation applies these same methods to add a second, supplementary step to identify MENA voters. We first link the 2020 Census MENA estimates at the Census tract level to the voter file. We then hand-coded approximately 3800 last names as likely MENA to gauge how accurate the Census location estimates match the voter file (over-sampling likely MENA precincts). And then we used the accuracy of those location estimates to tune and identify likely MENA last names in the Michigan voterfile.[3] Essentially, by identifying likely MENA surnames in places like Dearborn, where MENA are in the majority, we are better able to identify who are likely MENA voters who live in places where they are not in the majority. We then went through and estimated the probability that a person is MENA based on their location and their last name, conditional on whether they are likely to identify as white or other in the Census. This approach proved successful in identifying likely MENA voters, but also exposed some limitations given the low probability that Michigan voters are MENA outside white-concentrated areas.

Although studies show that using these methods produce reliable and valuable estimates for imputing race across the country (Rosenman, Olivella, and Kosuke 2022), we would like to note it has some limitations in how it handles MENA-associated last names. Since MENA individuals represent a small portion of white voters overall, the method rarely identifies MENA-specific names as highly likely to be white. In some cases, popular MENA names in Michigan are identified as being possibly Black or Hispanic (around 10-20% each) depending on the spelling.[4] That uncertainty, creates some poor estimates in areas where other minority populations are more prevalent. In summary, we believe it still undercounts MENA voters.

For illustration, let us look at two current or recent MENA US Representatives: Rashida Tlaib, a Democrat from Detroit, and Justin Amash, a Republican from near Grand Rapids. Justin Amash is registered in a largely white neighborhood. And the estimates are that he has essentially a 100% chance of being either white (95%) or other (5%) from the Khanna and Imai *wru* software program (Khanna et al., 2024). Moreover, our MENA-name based estimates give the Amash last name 95% chance of being MENA, such that we estimate a 95% chance of being MENA overall. In contrast, based on her name and the address where she is registered, Rashida Tlaib is originally estimated to have a 92% percent chance of being of MENA background if she is likely classified as white or other. But the *wru* algorithm estimates she is much more likely to be Black (75%) based on her uncommon name and her address. As a result, our first step only estimates her to be MENA at a 22% probability rate.

Based on cases like Tlaib and others, we decided to adjust our location-based estimates based on evidence that a name is highly likely to be MENA. Essentially, we discount the original racial categorization estimates if a name is subsequently identified to be likely MENA. For Tlaib's case, the evidence of a highly likely MENA name, increases her overall MENA chance estimate to be near 54% and downgrades her chances of being Black to about 45%. In other cases, this also upweights MENA names in Asian areas with MENA-name associations as well. For names with less than a 50% chance of being MENA, the changes are smaller. We believe that this estimate provides a realistic assessment of overall MENA rates, more so than what is assumed based on national estimates of an individual's chances of

[3] We only look at individuals who are likely White or Other to avoid accidentally including Black Muslims. We also selected about 50 names as having a high chance of being MENA based on their popularity in MENA countries.
[4] For instance, depending on the spelling of "Hammoud" (Hammood, Hamood, Hamoud) the estimated base rate probabilities of race range from 50-70% White, 10-20% Black, 0-20% Hispanic, and 10-30% Other (Rosenman, Olivella, and Kosuke 2022). The Hispanic rates likely represent the large Lebanese population in Mexico.

simply being White or other. It increases our estimates of the size of the MENA electorate by only about



10% over the data-driven baseline.

Findings

Black Voter Turnout Slipped and MENA Turnout Surged in 2024

Black voters continue to represent the largest racial or ethnic minority group in Michigan. But our estimates indicate that Black voters were the only racial or ethnic group to exhibit a decline in voters from 2020, despite larger turnout overall. Their vote share went from comprising nearly 12% of voters in 2020 to about 11.5% of voters in 2024, with approximately 659,000 voters in 2024 (about 9000 fewer voters).

Other minority groups saw small increases that kept pace with an increase in white voters, but we estimate the increase in MENA turnout in 2024 was much higher. Our estimates show the number of MENA voters increased from 76,000 to about 110,000, such that MENA voters moved from accounting for 1.4% of Michigan voters to 1.9%. This increase is remarkable given the relatively small size of the group overall. It nearly equals half the increase among Whites, despite Whites being nearly 40 times as large in overall size.

Notably, our estimates are slightly different than the Census's Current Population Survey estimate for multiple reasons. One, the CPS survey routinely underestimates Michigan turnout, having it only at 5.4 million instead of at 5.7 million in 2024 and at 5.0 instead of 5.6 million in 2020. Nonresponse to the CPS likely contributes to this and can be uneven across racial and ethnic groups.[5] We are also treating Hispanics and MENA as distinct



racial-ethnic groups. In the case of MENA, we are separately identifying MENA voters from White and Mixed/Other voters. We also have a greater percentage estimate of Mixed/Other because of cases in which surname information is minimal or conflicts with geographic-based estimates.

Table 1 compares our estimates to the CPS estimates. As noted, the use of the surname method mostly differs by estimating a larger share of "other" or "mixed" categorizations. This seems to mostly lower estimates of White and Hispanic compared to the CPS. But our method also has a lower estimate of Whites because we separate out MENA individuals from the Census categorization.

[5] The CPS is administered in-person and over the phone at the household level to current residents. It excludes voters in the armed forces because it is a labor market survey. Many older Michigan residents vote absentee but reside out of state during the colder months and would be unavailable to answer the November supplement.

Table 1: Current Population Survey vs. Voterfile Estimates of 2024 Voters

	CPS Estimated # *(%)*	*Voterfile Estimated #* *(%)*
White, non-Hispanic alone	4,448,000	4,378,000
	(81.7)	(76.7%)
Black alone	637,000	659,000
	(11.7)	(11.5)
Hispanic (any race)	193,000	164,000
	(3.5)	(2.9)
Asian alone	99,000	128,000
	(1.8)	(2.2)
Other/Mixed	67,000	266,000
	(1.2)	(4.7)
MENA	--	111,000
		(1.9)
Total	5,444,000	5,706,000

Despite these differences, both estimates point to similar types of changes. The CPS estimates Black voters declined 0.9 percentage points from 2020 (12.6%) to 2024 (11.7%), and we estimate a half-point drop in relative size (12.0% to 11.5%). Likewise, the CPS estimates Hispanic voters increased from 3.3% to 3.5% of the electorate, and we estimate that Hispanic voters increased from 2.6 to 2.9%. Based on these similarities in trends, we are confident in our estimate that Michigan saw a large surge in MENA voters in 2024.

High-MENA Precincts Changed Their Party Support

Our voterfile-based method of classification allows us to generate precinct-level estimates of the ethnic-racial composition of voters in each precinct and assess how those characteristics are associated with party support.[6] They do not allow us to observe how support changed among individual voters, but such evidence is still informative as to likely trends.

[6] We are unable to include Detroit's Absentee Voter Counting Board precincts since we cannot identify which votes were counted absentee by each precinct. We weight election day Detroit precinct totals to reflect the overall vote count for the City of Detroit.



There were many claims that Black support for Trump had grown, entering the 2024 election nationwide. And within Michigan, there were active efforts by both presidential candidates to court Black voters. We, however, fail to find sufficient evidence of any decline in support in Black-concentrated precincts. The relationship between the percentage of Black voters in a precinct and that precinct's party support is essentially the same across the 2020 and 2024 elections. Although there is a slight decline in Democratic support in heavily Black precincts, it is perhaps the smallest decline across racial and ethnic groups.

Precincts with over 80% Black voters supported Harris over Trump at a rate slightly over 92%, which is only slightly lower than the 94% rate of Biden support over Trump observed in 2020 in similar precincts. For a down ballot statewide contest like Education Board, these precincts voted at a 94% rate for Democrats over Republicans in 2024 as opposed to the 95% rate observed in 2020.

More generally, across precincts with high concentrations of nearly every racial and ethnic group we observe similar incremental gains in Republican support that are consistent with a relatively small, but broad swing away from the incumbent party.



However, this generalization fails to hold for precincts with high rates of MENA voters. Party support massively shifted in precincts with a high concentration of MENA voters across 2020 and 2024. In 2024, we estimate that 35 precincts had over 50% MENA voters. These precincts voted for Trump over Harris at a 2-1 rate, such that Harris only received 33% of the two-party vote. In 2020 it was the complete opposite; the two-party split in the top 35 MENA precincts was 77% for Biden and only 23% for Trump.

This sharp change in support in MENA precincts was not simply a swing toward embracing Donald Trump. Instead, we find it reflects an erosion of support for the national Democratic party and MENA opposition to the Biden administration's handling of the conflict in Gaza. This is evident in a couple ways.



First, while MENA precinct support for Democrats sharply declined, Republicans did not gain most of these votes. In the precincts with over 50% MENA voters, voter support for third-party candidates averaged about 31%, and increased to over 40% in some precincts with the highest concentration of MENA voters. Similar precincts in 2020 only supported third-party candidates at around 1%.

Second, MENA precinct support for the Democratic nominee was lowest when voting for President, increases somewhat for Senate, and then increases even more for nominees of State Board of Education. In those same 35 high-MENA precincts in which 33% of its voters support Harris in the two-party vote, the rate increased to 43% in supporting Elissa Slotkin over Mike Rogers for Senate, and it increased even more to 49% for supporting Democrats over Republicans for the state's Board of Education.



Trump's Margin of Victory was Equal to the MENA Protest Vote

Our estimates suggest that MENA precincts did not so much swing their votes toward Republicans as much as they swung their votes away from national Democrats, especially Kamala Harris. In a close state like Michigan, it is instructive to estimate how many votes MENA precincts gave to Trump or took away from Harris based on their support in other offices or years.

We estimated a seemingly unrelated regression[7] that models a precinct's expected two-party support and its expected third-party support as a function of what percentage of its voters were non-MENA White (using a natural cubic spline), Black, and MENA, across three state-wide offices up for election (President, Senate, and State Board of Education). We also account for how ballot roll-off influenced party support in the two down-ballot races. We also weigh these estimates by the number of voters in a precinct to make these generalizations specific to the statewide total vote.[8]

[7] The use of a seemingly unrelated regression account for any correlated precinct-level idiosyncrasies that explain party support across these six dependent variables. These correlations are as high as .96 across the two-party support items for the President, Senate, and State Board of Education elections.

[8] Detroit precincts are reweighted to represent the city's total vote because about half of its votes are tabulated in separate absentee vote counting bureaus.



Our regression estimates allow us to estimate what Trump's margin of victory would have been if MENA support was similar to other contests down ballot or in 2020, when holding the effects of White and Black precinct concentration constant. Trump won the State of Michigan by a margin of 80,103 votes over Kamala Harris. If precinct MENA party support for Harris mirrored what it looked like for the Senate or State Board of Education elections, then we estimate Trump's margin of victory would have shrunk down to about 34-35,000 votes. The gap would shrink further to only about 9000 votes if MENA support mirrored the relationship between Biden and Trump and precinct MENA composition in 2020. Finally, if we saw MENA party support for President in 2024 like it was for the Senate in 2020, when Gary Peters won over John James, then we estimate Harris would have more than likely one by a small margin of 440 votes.

Which districts had a greater share of Black and MENA voters in 2024?

An advantage of our estimates is that we can provide more localized estimates of the minority composition of the vote. Black and MENA residents disproportionately live around the Detroit metro area across Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. The four US House districts that primarily represent this area also are the districts with the greatest representation of each group compared to the rest of the state.



We estimate that these four US House districts had 30% or more of its 2024 voters come from minority racial or ethnic groups. Rashida Tlaib's 12th district had the smallest percentage of Non-MENA White voters in 2024, as this district has the largest share of MENA voters and nearly the same percentage of Black voters as Shri Thanedar's 13th district. The 10th and 11th districts have the next largest contingent of MENA voters, with MENA voters accounting for 5.7 and 4.0 percent of each district's respective vote.

State Senate

State Senators were not up for election in 2024, but for comparison's sake, it is instructive to display the 13 Senate districts that had greater than 30% of its 2024 vote likely cast by voters from ethnic and racial minority groups. Sylvia A. Santana's district clearly has the largest contingent of MENA voters, but Michael Webber, Rosemary Bayer, and Stephanie Chang each represent districts with greater than 5% MENA voters.


Michigan State Senate Districts with Largest Composition of Minority Voters
State Senator (District)
Sylvia A. Santana (2)
Stephanie Chang (3)
Jeremy Moss (7)
Erika Geiss (1)
Paul Wojno (10)
Mary Cavanagh (6)
Mallory McMorrow (8)
Dayna Polehanki (5)
John Cherry (27)
Michael Webber (9)
Winnie Brinks (29)
Rosemary Bayer (13)
Veronica Klinefelt (11)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Proportion of District's 2024 Voters
Group
MENA
Non-MENA Other
Asian
Hispanic
Black

State House

We estimate that 12 Michigan House districts saw over 50% of their votes come from racial or ethnic minorities. In ten of these districts, Black voters were a large enough contingent to account for at least half of the overall vote. But we also estimate that an additional two Michigan House districts had a large component of MENA voters to make the district less than 50% non-MENA White. We estimate Alabas Farhat's 3rd district had over 56% MENA voters in 2024, and Erin Byrnes's15th district had nearly 33% MENA voters. The only other Michigan House district with a significant component of voters from another minority group is Tyrone Carter's 1st district, where we estimate Hispanics accounted for 29% of the total vote.

Most Michigan House districts with significant minority populations tend to be represented by Democrats. But this is not as true for MENA voters. When looking at the top 10 Michigan House districts by percent of MENA voters, we find that Republicans represent four of the ten. Tom Kuhn, Ron Robinson, and Douglas Wozniak are Republican Representatives who have MENA voters casting over 5%



of the votes in their district.



Conclusion

Scholars, journalists, and practitioners often struggle to identify the size and political opinions of minority groups. In one cases, the lack of clear data on Black voters in Michigan promoted doubts that Black support would not come near 2020 levels. Our voterfile based analysis, while finding some potential decline in turnout, fails to confirm those narratives. Black support for Democrats in 2024 largely mirrored support in 2020. In other cases, the lack of clear data can lead to groups being overlooked as consequential voting blocs given their small numerical representation. Since razor-thin margins were consequential for the presidential race, even smaller groups can have consequential roles. The results shared in this report suggest this was the case for MENA voters in 2024 and underscore the need to take organized voting blocs seriously.

Indeed, the substantial shift in MENA party support signals that not all racial-ethnic voting blocks are strongly attached to either major political party. Considering that rates of voters changing their party support typically range around 8-12 percent, a massive shift of nearly 45 percentage points in presidential major-party voting rates speaks to MENA voters lacking a clear home in national politics.

The 2024 election also saw a slight decline in Black turnout, from 12% in 2020 to 11.5% in 2024. This potentially signals an erosion in the mobilizing infrastructure that historically produces high Black turnout (Pinderhugues 1987). The decline is also notable because it came despite having a phenotypically Black woman at the top of the ticket, demonstrating descriptive representation is not sufficient for mobilizing

voters if not paired with robust mobilization efforts (Tate 1993; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Wamble 2024). For Black voters, the turnout gap was not like MENA voters, since those who voted 92% remained fiercely Democratic. Instead, this pattern more so suggests that Black Michigan voters believed that no candidate addressed their community's priorities, leading them to not vote at all. The precinct data likewise displays both the durability and the fragility of Black Democratic support. Unlike MENA voters, Black voters have been socialized to conceptualize political engagement through partisan loyalty and not individual candidates' positions. The Black voter's pragmatism is very different from that of the MENA protest voter.

Regardless of whether these shifts are large enough to fully account for Trump's margin of victory, we believe we have highlighted the need to sharpen our understanding of where minority voting blocs are prevalent and can have an influence. Even relatively small groups of minority voters matter for Michigan politics when they live in concentrated areas and act somewhat uniformly.

Citations

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Bernard L. Fraga, and Brian F. Schaffner. 2022. "The Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement Overstates Minority Turnout" *Journal of Politics* 84(3): 1850-1855. https://doi.org/10.1086/717260

Bauman, Kurt. 2018. "How Well Does the Current Population Survey Measure the Composition of the U.S. Voting Population?" Working paper no. 2018-25, US Census Bureau, Washington, DC. https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2018/demo/SEHSD-WP2018-25.html

Cohen, Cathy J. 1999. The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics. University of Chicago Press.

Dawson, Michael C. 1995. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. Princeton University Press.

Elliott, Marc N., Allen Fremont, Peter A. Morrison, Philip Pantoja, and Nicole Lurie. 2008. "A new method for estimating race/ethnicity and associated disparities where administrative records lack self-reported race/ethnicity." *Health services research* 43(5p1): 1722-1736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2008.00854.x

Hasan-Aslih, Siwar, Fade, Eadeh, Sohad, Murrar and Nura, Sediqe. 2025. "Arab and Muslim American pre-election study report 2024." https://www.siwaraslih.com/election24

Hur, Aram and Christopher H. Achen. 2013. "Coding Voter Turnout Responses in the Current Population Survey" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 77(4): 985–993. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nft042

Imai, Kosuke, and Kabir Khanna, 2016. "Improving ecological inference by predicting individual ethnicity from voter registration records" *Political Analysis*, *24*(2), pp.263-272. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpw001

Khanna, Kabir, Brandon Bertelsen, Santiago Olivella, Evan T. Rosenman, Alexander Rossell Hayes, Kosuke Imai (2024). *wru: Who are You? Bayesian Prediction of Racial Category Using Surname, First Name, Middle Name, and Geolocation*. R package version 3.0.4, https://github.com/kosukeimai/wru.

King, Maya, Jonathan Weisman, and Ruth Igielnik. 2024. "Black Voters Drift From Democrats, Imperiling Harris's Bid, Poll Shows" *The New York Times*, October 12. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/us/politics/poll-black-voters-harris-trump.html

Lerer, Lisa. 2024. “In a Harris Ad, a Black Man Speaks to Black Men on Her Behalf” *The New York Times*, October 16. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/16/us/politics/in-a-harris-ad-a-black-man-speaks-to-black-men-on-her-behalf.html

Mogahed, Dalia. 2024. “Winning Muslim Votes: A Policy Priority Analysis in Swing States.” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.” https://ispu.org/winning-muslim-votes-1

Paz, Christian. 2024. “The Republican Party is less white than ever. Thank Donald Trump.” *Vox*, September 25. https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/373535/3-theories-gop-donald-trump-nonwhite-voters-hispanic-black-latino-asian

Pinderhughes, Dianne. 1987. Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics: A Reexamination of Pluralist Theory. First Edition. University of Illinois Press.

Sanchez, Gabriel. 2008. “Latino Group Consciousness and Perceptions of Commonality with African Americans.” *Social Science Quarterly* 89 (2): 428–44

Rosenman, Evan T., Santiago Olivella. and Kosuke Imai. 2023. “Race and ethnicity data for first, middle, and surnames.” *Scientific data*, *10*(1), p.299.

White, Ismail K., and Chryl N. Laird. 2020. Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior. Princeton University Press.

2024 Voter Composition by Race-Ethnicity

US House Estimates

District	Representative	Party	Non-MENA White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	MENA
1	Jack Bergman	Republican	91.71%	0.80%	0.87%	0.26%	6.13%	0.24%
2	John Moolenaar	Republican	91.25%	1.58%	2.20%	0.28%	4.51%	0.18%
3	Hillary Scholten	Democratic	79.31%	8.59%	5.32%	1.97%	4.52%	0.29%
4	Bill Huizenga	Republican	82.18%	6.80%	4.54%	1.39%	4.88%	0.22%
5	Tim Walberg	Republican	88.43%	3.47%	2.54%	0.44%	4.86%	0.27%
6	Debbie Dingell	Democratic	72.51%	10.25%	2.87%	7.50%	5.16%	1.72%
7	Tom Barrett	Republican	84.23%	5.39%	3.16%	1.79%	4.89%	0.54%
8	Kristen McDonald Rivet	Democratic	78.40%	12.74%	3.06%	0.70%	4.70%	0.40%
9	Lisa McClain	Republican	89.20%	2.65%	1.94%	0.99%	4.12%	1.10%
10	John James	Republican	70.22%	13.32%	1.63%	4.87%	4.20%	5.76%
11	Haley Stevens	Democratic	70.75%	12.84%	2.56%	5.47%	4.33%	4.06%
12	Rashida Tlaib	Democratic	41.23%	42.54%	1.87%	1.36%	3.78%	9.22%
13	Shri Thanedar	Democratic	42.32%	43.29%	5.75%	1.80%	4.22%	2.63%

State Senate Estimates

District	Senator	Party	Non-MENA White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	MENA
1	Erika Geiss	Democratic	46.02%	35.51%	11.55%	0.67%	4.69%	1.56%
2	Sylvia Santana	Democratic	32.08%	25.48%	4.99%	1.50%	2.83%	33.13%
3	Stephanie Chang	Democratic	39.31%	41.45%	1.44%	7.43%	4.15%	6.22%
4	Darrin Camilleri	Democratic	73.75%	14.95%	3.86%	1.40%	5.33%	0.70%
5	Dayna Polehanki	Democratic	64.26%	18.64%	2.35%	7.26%	4.93%	2.56%
6	Mary Cavanagh	Democratic	52.08%	37.79%	1.66%	2.48%	4.19%	1.79%
7	Jeremy Moss	Democratic	45.08%	42.29%	3.17%	3.14%	4.07%	2.25%
8	Mallory McMorrow	Democratic	57.92%	33.89%	1.44%	1.51%	3.96%	1.28%
9	Paul Wojno	Democratic	66.73%	5.39%	2.01%	12.68%	3.76%	9.44%
10	Michael D. McDonald	Republican	49.00%	37.26%	1.21%	3.93%	3.89%	4.72%
11	Veronica Klinefelt	Democratic	69.84%	19.50%	1.51%	1.88%	4.40%	2.88%
12	Kevin Daley	Republican	80.65%	11.54%	1.51%	0.85%	4.21%	1.23%
13	Rosemary Bayer	Democratic	69.19%	9.91%	1.69%	8.74%	3.79%	6.68%
14	Sue Shink	Democratic	83.57%	4.87%	2.14%	3.52%	5.31%	0.60%
15	Jeff Irwin	Democratic	70.05%	12.80%	3.41%	6.50%	5.95%	1.30%
16	Joseph N. Bellino Jr.	Republican	89.58%	2.35%	2.95%	0.29%	4.58%	0.27%
17	Jonathan Lindsey	Republican	87.46%	3.99%	2.72%	0.46%	5.02%	0.35%
18	Thomas A. Albert	Republican	87.50%	4.30%	2.21%	0.95%	4.86%	0.16%
19	Sean McCann	Democratic	80.20%	9.22%	2.89%	1.58%	5.79%	0.32%
20	Aric Nesbitt	Republican	82.36%	7.29%	4.18%	1.35%	4.66%	0.16%
21	Sarah Anthony	Democratic	76.00%	11.00%	5.18%	1.64%	5.76%	0.42%
22	Lana Theis	Republican	91.95%	1.37%	1.43%	0.57%	4.24%	0.45%
23	Sam Singh	Democratic	85.83%	4.06%	2.63%	1.66%	4.57%	1.24%
24	Ruth Johnson	Republican	86.73%	2.61%	2.05%	1.90%	3.90%	2.80%
25	Dan Lauwers	Republican	91.54%	2.20%	1.73%	0.27%	3.89%	0.38%
26	Michele Hoitenga	Republican	89.07%	3.51%	2.46%	0.24%	4.50%	0.23%
27	John Cherry	Democratic	64.98%	25.87%	2.24%	0.88%	5.35%	0.68%
28	Mark Huizenga	Republican	84.26%	4.37%	3.09%	2.80%	4.81%	0.67%
29	Winnie Brinks	Democratic	67.49%	14.31%	9.83%	3.30%	4.76%	0.31%
30	Roger Victory	Republican	85.19%	4.79%	3.85%	1.47%	4.33%	0.37%
31	Rick Outman	Republican	87.43%	1.58%	5.91%	1.43%	3.49%	0.16%
32	Jon Bumstead	Republican	84.88%	6.49%	3.04%	0.26%	5.16%	0.17%
33	Roger Hauck	Republican	91.72%	1.54%	2.29%	0.25%	4.02%	0.17%
34	Annette Glenn	Republican	91.48%	1.53%	1.75%	0.31%	4.73%	0.20%
35	Timmy Beson	Republican	79.77%	10.02%	4.66%	0.94%	4.35%	0.25%
36	Ed McBroom	Republican	93.75%	0.81%	0.87%	0.19%	4.12%	0.26%
37	John Damoose	Republican	90.22%	0.80%	1.08%	0.31%	7.34%	0.25%
38	Cam Cavitt	Republican	91.14%	0.85%	0.67%	0.27%	6.87%	0.20%

State House Estimates

District	Senator	Party	Non-MENA White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	MENA
1	Tyrone Carter	Democratic	16.63%	47.29%	29.38%	0.35%	3.72%	2.63%
2	Kimberly L. Edwards	Democratic	67.79%	9.79%	13.47%	0.84%	4.97%	3.14%
3	Alabas Farhat	Democratic	25.58%	10.07%	3.51%	2.44%	1.91%	56.50%
4	Karen Whitsett	Democratic	6.25%	86.51%	1.03%	0.16%	2.94%	3.11%
5	Natalie Price	Democratic	18.65%	75.74%	0.76%	0.43%	3.38%	1.06%
6	Regina Weiss	Democratic	84.09%	6.12%	1.75%	2.31%	4.09%	1.64%
7	Helena Scott	Democratic	12.00%	59.55%	0.80%	10.95%	2.93%	13.78%
8	Mike McFall	Democratic	35.13%	57.85%	1.34%	0.82%	4.01%	0.86%
9	Abraham Aiyash	Democratic	23.76%	68.46%	1.61%	1.56%	3.78%	0.84%
10	Joe Tate	Democratic	57.87%	34.61%	1.30%	1.16%	3.44%	1.62%
11	Veronica Paiz	Democratic	23.75%	67.18%	1.07%	2.78%	4.24%	0.98%
12	Kimberly L. Edwards	Democratic	51.66%	41.57%	1.32%	0.64%	4.07%	0.74%
13	Lori Stone	Democratic	72.68%	16.63%	1.36%	2.52%	4.84%	1.96%
14	Donovan McKinney	Democratic	64.08%	16.09%	1.81%	8.67%	5.13%	4.23%
15	Erin Byrnes	Democratic	49.21%	9.32%	3.92%	1.58%	3.36%	32.61%
16	Stephanie Young	Democratic	39.95%	52.54%	1.59%	0.79%	4.03%	1.10%
17	Laurie Pohutsky	Democratic	51.93%	39.03%	1.69%	1.41%	4.37%	1.56%
18	Jason Hoskins	Democratic	38.54%	52.33%	1.23%	2.15%	4.10%	1.65%
19	Samantha Steckloff	Democratic	61.47%	23.45%	1.31%	5.19%	3.79%	4.80%
20	Noah Arbit	Democratic	65.87%	11.46%	1.35%	5.72%	3.68%	11.92%
21	Kelly Breen	Democratic	67.20%	9.84%	2.04%	14.19%	4.25%	2.48%
22	Richard Steenland	Democratic	83.86%	3.92%	1.83%	4.21%	3.64%	2.53%
23	Jamie Churches	Democratic	72.37%	5.56%	3.09%	12.31%	4.84%	1.84%
24	Steve Marino	Republican	61.73%	12.03%	2.16%	15.68%	4.60%	3.81%
25	Peter Herzberg	Democratic	64.50%	22.22%	2.62%	3.04%	5.51%	2.11%
26	Dylan Wegela	Democratic	53.32%	36.42%	2.48%	0.70%	5.59%	1.49%
27	Kevin Coleman	Democratic	85.42%	4.30%	4.31%	0.75%	4.67%	0.56%
28	Robert Kullberg	Republican	76.97%	10.50%	4.25%	2.20%	5.25%	0.83%
29	James DeSana	Republican	75.29%	13.69%	4.03%	0.78%	5.65%	0.55%
30	William Bruck	Republican	90.18%	2.46%	2.13%	0.33%	4.54%	0.36%

31	Dale Zorn	Republican	75.01%	15.93%	2.16%	0.89%	5.52%	0.49%
32	Jimmie Wilson Jr.	Democratic	57.60%	27.13%	3.94%	2.96%	6.96%	1.42%
33	Morgan Foreman	Democratic	73.47%	7.84%	3.20%	8.16%	5.74%	1.58%
34	Donavan McKinney	Democratic	87.85%	2.08%	5.02%	0.25%	4.58%	0.21%
35	Shannon Kane	Republican	91.93%	1.13%	1.85%	0.27%	4.02%	0.80%
36	Steve Carra	Republican	88.94%	2.78%	2.92%	0.30%	4.93%	0.12%

District	Senator	Party	Non-MENA White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	MENA
37	Angela Witwer	Democratic	83.74%	5.76%	3.29%	1.02%	6.06%	0.14%
38	Joey Andrews	Democratic	77.40%	13.92%	3.07%	0.93%	4.50%	0.18%
39	Pauline Wendzel	Republican	86.50%	2.26%	5.27%	0.24%	5.58%	0.15%
40	Christine Morse	Democratic	82.13%	6.73%	2.46%	2.90%	5.36%	0.42%
41	Julie Rogers	Democratic	67.37%	19.46%	4.78%	1.09%	6.92%	0.38%
42	Matt Hall	Republican	88.05%	4.07%	1.76%	0.64%	5.30%	0.18%
43	Rachelle Smit	Republican	91.55%	1.12%	2.83%	0.29%	4.08%	0.13%
44	Steve Frisbie	Republican	74.39%	13.26%	3.44%	2.41%	6.35%	0.16%
45	Sarah Lightner	Republican	91.25%	2.32%	1.48%	0.27%	4.52%	0.16%
46	Kathy Schmaltz	Republican	82.96%	8.01%	2.24%	0.68%	5.92%	0.19%
47	Graham Filler	Republican	84.57%	3.73%	2.20%	3.64%	5.24%	0.61%
48	Jennifer Conlin	Democratic	86.47%	2.50%	1.63%	4.07%	4.53%	0.80%
49	Ann Bollin	Republican	84.82%	4.96%	1.93%	2.44%	4.27%	1.58%
50	Brenda Carter	Democratic	92.52%	1.00%	1.46%	0.47%	4.16%	0.39%
51	Mike Mueller	Republican	89.19%	2.34%	1.75%	0.98%	4.48%	1.26%
52	Mike Harris	Republican	86.80%	3.77%	3.21%	1.11%	4.53%	0.59%
53	Brenda Carter	Democratic	51.04%	32.63%	8.98%	1.37%	5.08%	0.91%
54	Donni Steele	Republican	76.58%	7.15%	2.83%	6.14%	4.42%	2.88%
55	Mark Tisdel	Republican	77.03%	4.19%	2.43%	8.87%	4.13%	3.34%
56	Thomas Kuhn	Republican	71.79%	4.85%	1.79%	14.09%	4.01%	3.47%
57	Gary Howell	Republican	53.97%	6.57%	1.52%	13.10%	3.17%	21.67%
58	Andrew Fink	Republican	70.34%	9.66%	1.69%	5.47%	4.04%	8.79%
59	Steve Johnson	Republican	82.51%	3.45%	1.59%	3.04%	3.38%	6.02%

60	Joseph Aragona	Republican	79.03%	7.70%	1.72%	2.93%	3.84%	4.77%
61	Phil Skaggs	Democratic	73.84%	14.10%	1.62%	2.36%	4.39%	3.70%
62	Jim Haadsma	Democratic	78.58%	13.23%	1.43%	0.90%	4.62%	1.24%
63	Jay DeBoyer	Republican	89.56%	3.68%	1.30%	0.47%	4.13%	0.85%
64	Matthew Bierlein	Republican	88.99%	3.47%	2.01%	0.36%	4.83%	0.35%
65	Jaime Greene	Republican	90.88%	2.17%	2.36%	0.26%	3.85%	0.49%
66	Andrew Beeler	Republican	88.58%	2.05%	2.23%	1.35%	4.10%	1.69%
67	Phil Green	Republican	89.47%	3.34%	1.74%	0.22%	4.99%	0.24%
68	Kara Hope	Democratic	83.33%	7.47%	2.22%	1.20%	5.16%	0.61%
69	Betsy Coffia	Democratic	72.33%	19.27%	1.97%	0.53%	5.14%	0.76%
70	Christine Morse	Democratic	38.41%	52.78%	2.60%	0.23%	5.77%	0.21%
71	Brian BeGole	Republican	92.03%	1.54%	1.59%	0.24%	4.34%	0.25%
72	Brian BeGole	Republican	92.03%	1.54%	1.59%	0.24%	4.34%	0.25%
73	Bryan Posthumus	Republican	86.24%	5.71%	1.84%	0.77%	4.79%	0.65%
74	Kara Hope	Democratic	65.64%	17.15%	7.07%	2.57%	6.97%	0.60%
75	Rachel Hood	Democratic	83.49%	4.69%	3.02%	2.85%	5.03%	0.92%
76	Kristian Grant	Democratic	81.57%	7.85%	3.69%	1.54%	4.95%	0.40%
77	Emily Dievendorf	Democratic	76.33%	9.87%	6.24%	1.29%	5.88%	0.40%

District	Senator	Party	Non-MENA White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	MENA
78	Joey Andrews	Democratic	92.43%	1.37%	2.00%	0.23%	3.80%	0.16%
79	Pauline Wendzel	Republican	86.68%	3.92%	2.75%	2.46%	3.97%	0.21%
80	Christine Morse	Democratic	74.89%	10.03%	4.44%	5.56%	4.45%	0.64%
81	Ranjeev Puri	Democratic	83.62%	6.32%	3.10%	2.01%	4.51%	0.44%
82	Kristian Grant	Democratic	62.75%	22.64%	7.48%	1.78%	5.03%	0.32%
83	John Fitzgerald	Democratic	65.83%	8.95%	17.87%	2.46%	4.72%	0.17%
84	Carol Glanville	Democratic	82.38%	5.76%	5.93%	1.03%	4.73%	0.18%
85	Penelope Tsernoglou	Democratic	90.60%	1.38%	3.45%	1.23%	3.19%	0.16%
86	Nancy DeBoer	Republican	78.87%	2.30%	12.58%	2.49%	3.58%	0.18%
87	Luke Meerman	Republican	71.82%	18.23%	3.58%	0.25%	5.97%	0.14%
88	Greg VanWoerkom	Republican	90.72%	1.78%	2.51%	0.74%	4.09%	0.16%
89	Angela Rigas	Republican	90.71%	1.93%	2.82%	0.39%	4.00%	0.16%

90	Bradley Slagh	Republican	90.52%	1.94%	2.72%	0.52%	4.06%	0.22%
91	Pat Outman	Republican	92.32%	1.28%	1.98%	0.20%	4.07%	0.15%
92	Curt VanderWall	Republican	87.75%	2.18%	3.02%	0.60%	6.24%	0.20%
93	Graham Filler	Republican	89.54%	3.14%	3.01%	0.78%	3.25%	0.28%
94	Timmy Beson	Republican	54.33%	30.88%	9.11%	0.74%	4.71%	0.23%
95	Amos O'Neal	Democratic	91.29%	1.31%	1.50%	1.16%	4.54%	0.20%
96	Timothy Beson	Republican	90.25%	1.64%	3.55%	0.30%	4.05%	0.21%
97	Matthew Bierlein	Republican	90.99%	2.47%	2.20%	0.22%	3.91%	0.22%
98	Gregory Alexander	Republican	94.24%	0.70%	1.53%	0.15%	3.08%	0.31%
99	Mike Hoadley	Republican	93.76%	0.87%	0.97%	0.18%	3.94%	0.27%
100	Joseph Fox	Republican	92.31%	1.61%	1.12%	0.24%	4.53%	0.20%
101	Joseph Fox	Republican	91.31%	1.55%	2.22%	0.20%	4.55%	0.18%
102	Curt VanderWall	Republican	90.05%	1.21%	3.48%	0.16%	4.93%	0.18%
103	Betsy Coffia	Democratic	92.15%	0.74%	1.52%	0.42%	4.93%	0.24%
104	John Roth	Republican	92.94%	0.76%	1.13%	0.24%	4.67%	0.25%
105	Ken Borton	Republican	93.71%	0.82%	0.84%	0.19%	4.15%	0.29%
106	Cam Cavitt	Republican	93.54%	0.64%	0.61%	0.16%	4.78%	0.27%
107	Parker Fairbairn	Republican	86.83%	0.81%	0.70%	0.24%	11.19%	0.23%
108	Dave Prestin	Republican	88.81%	0.84%	0.62%	0.14%	9.42%	0.17%
109	Karl Bohnak	Republican	90.31%	1.46%	0.71%	0.22%	7.11%	0.20%
110	Greg Markkanen	Republican	93.83%	0.47%	0.67%	0.43%	4.39%	0.22%