

Michigan Policy Insiders Panel (MPIP) Report Appendix - Round 1

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Section AA. Demographic Summary

Table A1 provides a breakdown of the demographic characteristics of the political insiders who responded to each of the first two rounds of the Michigan Political Insiders Panel survey. In addition, it includes a comparison to results from the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR)'s State of the State Survey, which is representative of the general adult population of Michigan.

Table A1. Demographic Breakdown of MPIP Panel, by Round

Demographic Characteristics		MPIP ^a Round 1	MPIP ^a Round 2	SOSS ^a (General MI Population)
Party Identification^b	Republican	33%	35%	29%
	Independent	30%	29%	34%
	Democrat	37%	36%	37%
Ideology	Conservative	16%	16%	40%
	In the Middle	61%	62%	36%
	Liberal	23%	22%	24%
Race/Ethnicity^c	White	90%	92%	78%
	Black	8%	6%	12%
	Hispanic	2%	1%	4%
Gender	Male	62%	64%	49%
	Female	38%	36%	51%
Ideology	No 4-Yr Degree	4%	3%	61%
	4-Yr Degree	44%	47%	24%
	Graduate Degree	53%	50%	15%
n		526	402	995

^a MPIP percentages are unweighted from a non-probability sample; SOSS percentages use survey weights.

^b Third party identifiers were excluded from Party ID percentages only.

^c Racial/ethnic categories were not mutually exclusive; respondents could select as many as applied to them.

The demographic breakdown of MPIP respondents was very similar across both rounds of data collection, although Round 2 respondents were on average *slightly more likely* to be white, male, and Republican than Round 1 respondents.

Compared to the SOSS estimates of the general Michigan population, members of both rounds of the Michigan Political Insiders Panel were, on average:

- *More likely* to identify as Republican and *less likely* to identify as Independent,
- *More likely* to identify as “In the Middle” ideologically and *less likely* to identify as Conservative,
- *More likely* to identify themselves as White / Caucasian, and
- *More likely* to identify themselves as Male.
- *More likely* to have a college degree, and *more likely* to have a graduate degree.

Section AB. Social Identity of Partisanship and Ideology

The “social identity” aspect of partisanship and ideology refers to the convergence between an individual’s partisan and social identities – that is, the extent to which they identify with a particular party or ideology as a social group. The MPIP Round 2 survey measured the strength of these identities for self-identified partisans and ideologues using three questions apiece for partisanship and ideology. These questions asked:

- How well the term [Democrat / Republican / Liberal / Conservative] describes them,
- How often they use “we” instead of “they” when talking about [Democrats / Republicans / Liberals / Conservatives], and
- How important, if at all, being a [Democrat / Republican / Liberal / Conservative] is to them.

For both partisanship and ideology, these three items were combined into 12-point indexes measuring strength of socio-partisan identity and strength of socio-ideological identity. The distribution of these scales are summarized in this section.

Below, Figure A1 illustrates that respondents generally expressed, on average, a moderately strong socio-partisan identity with their preferred political party, with most respondents falling near the center of the scale.

Figure A1. Histogram of Socio-Partisan Identity (Among Partisan Identifiers)




Table A2 shows the average score on the socio-partisan identity scale separately for self-identified Republicans and Democrats. The results indicate that Democrats who responded to the MPIP Round 2 survey identify more strongly with their party as a social group than did Republicans.

Table A2. Mean “Socio-Partisan Identity” Score, by Political Party

Demographic Characteristics		Mean ^a	n
Overall		6.35	338
Party Identification^b	Republican	6.75	126
	Democrat	7.20	133

^a Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police

^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents and therefore excluded from this table, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Below, Figure A2 illustrates that respondents generally expressed, on average, a moderately strong socio-ideological identity with their preferred ideology, with most respondents falling near the center of the scale.

Figure A2. Histogram of Socio-Ideological Identity (Among Ideological Identifiers)




Table A3 shows the average score on the socio-partisan identity scale separately for self-identified Republicans and Democrats. The results indicate that Conservatives who responded to the MPIP Round 2 survey identify more strongly with their ideology as a social group than did Liberals.

Table A3. Mean “Socio-Ideological Identity” Score, by Demographic Characteristics

Demographic Characteristics		Mean ^a	n
Overall		7.36	239
Ideology^b	Conservative	7.51	95
	Liberal	7.24	138
^a Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police			
^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.			

Section AC. 2016 United States Presidential Election – Supplemental Analyses

The MPIP surveys included a number of questions which can be used to evaluate common hypotheses and popular narratives about the 2016 presidential election and Donald Trump's victory, which came as a surprise to many pundits.

Table A4, below, indicates that among the political insiders in the MPIP panel, those who supported either major contender in the Democratic primaries (i.e., Clinton or Bernie Sanders) overwhelmingly preferred Clinton in the general election. However, insiders who supported any Republican candidate besides Trump in the Republican primaries were far more split between Clinton and Trump in the general election.

Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by disgruntled Sanders supporters abandoning her in November. However, it must be noted that the MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

Table A4. General Election Vote Preference, by Candidate Supported in Primary Elections

<u>Supported in Primaries</u>	<u>General Election Support</u>			n
	Clinton	Trump	No preference	
Hillary Clinton	100%	0%	0%	108
Bernie Sanders	95%	2%	4%	55
Donald Trump	9%	82%	9%	11
John Kasich	38%	23%	39%	122
Other Republican	25%	42%	33%	69
None of the above	77%	12%	12%	26
TOTAL	62%	18%	20%	391

Below, Table A5 shows that among Michigan political insiders, support for major third-party presidential candidates Gary Johnson and Jill Stein came exclusively from Republicans and Independents, very few of whom indicated a preference for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump if they had only those two choices.

Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by a “spoiler effect” where third party candidates stole away votes that would otherwise have gone to her. Again, though, it must be noted that MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

Table A5. Support for Third-Party Candidates, by Party and Major Candidate Preference

Demographic Characteristics		Gary Johnson	Jill Stein	n
Overall		11%	1%	393
Party Identification^a	Republican	18%	1%	124
	Independent	17%	3%	107
	Democrat	0%	0%	135
Major Party Candidate Preference	Trump	4%	3%	70
	Clinton	5%	0%	246
	No Preference	38%	1%	76

^a Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Finally, Table A6 below shows that Democrats and Clinton supporters who answered the MPIP survey were more likely than Republicans and Trump supporters to say they would “definitely” vote in the general election. Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by an “enthusiasm gap” where her supporters were less passionate about the race and therefore less likely to turn out than Trump’s supporters. Once again, MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

Table A6. Likelihood of Voting in Presidential Election, by Party and Major Candidate Preference

Demographic Characteristics		Will “Definitely” Vote	Less Than “Definitely”	n
Overall		90%	10%	397
Party Identification^a	Republican	81%	19%	127
	Independent	92%	8%	108
	Democrat	100%	0%	134
Major Party Candidate Preference	Trump	94%	6%	70
	Clinton	96%	4%	245
	No Preference	70%	30%	77

^a Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Section AD. Accuracy of 2016 Political Predictions

In addition to questions about their personal preferences, MPIP panelists were also asked to predict a number of 2016 political outcomes. Many pundits and analysts notoriously failed to predict several of these outcomes, and the results of MPIP Round 2 suggest that Michigan's political insiders did not fare much better.

Table A7, below, shows the percentage of respondents from each political party and with various levels of political knowledge (as estimated using the number of correct responses to a number of Michigan political knowledge questions administered in MPIP Round 1) who correctly predicted each of six different political outcomes from 2016.

Table A7. Percentage of Respondents who Correctly Predicted Certain 2016 Political Outcomes

Demographic Characteristics		Percent Correctly Predicted ^a					
		Autonomous Vehicles Law	Energy Competition Law	Michigan House (GOP Seats) ^b	Pres. Election (Winner)	Pres. Election (MI Winner)	Pres. Election (EV Count) ^c
Overall		47%	41%	14%	8%	7%	2%
Party ID	Republican	54%	49%	16%	16%	11%	4%
	Independent	38%	33%	18%	6%	6%	2%
	Democrat	47%	43%	7%	2%	2%	0%
Political Knowledge^d	High	53%	47%	10%	6%	3%	2%
	Medium	46%	40%	12%	11%	11%	2%
	Low	29%	28%	29%	7%	8%	0%

^a Percentages are out of the number of respondents who answered each individual question.

^b Predictions of GOP seats in the Michigan House were scored as “correct” if they were within three seats (i.e., roughly three percent of the 110 total seats in the chamber) of the actual outcome, which was 63 GOP seats. In other words, predictions between 60 and 66 (inclusive) were coded as “correct.”

^c Predictions of the electoral vote count for the presidential election were scored as “correct” if they were within 16 electoral votes (i.e., roughly three percent of the 538 total votes in the Electoral College) of the actual outcome. For the true outcome, we counted EITHER the total electoral votes controlled by the states (and districts in Maine) Hillary Clinton won (232), OR the number of votes received in the actual Electoral College after “faithless electors” voted for candidates other than Trump or Clinton (227). In other words, predictions between 211 and 248 (inclusive) Clinton votes were coded as “correct.”

^d Political knowledge was estimated for each respondent using the number of correct answers to a set of Michigan political knowledge questions administered in Round 1, which included identifying the names of both US Senators from Michigan, the number of justices on Michigan's Supreme Court, and the number of individuals in Michigan's state Senate.

The outcomes included in the table are (listed in order from most correctly predicted to least correctly predicted) the passage of state legislation on autonomous vehicles, the passage of state legislation on energy competition and renewables, the number of Michigan House of Representatives seats held by the Republican Party after the elections, the winner of the presidential election overall, the winner of Michigan's electoral votes in the presidential election, and the number of electoral votes won by Hillary Clinton in the presidential election.

Fewer than half of Michigan insiders in the panel correctly predicted each of these outcomes, and only the predictions about state legislation and state elections even exceeded 10 percent correct.


Republican respondents were more likely than Democratic respondents to correctly predict each outcome, which may be a result of the fact that:

- Most of these outcomes would be considered favorable to the Republican Party, and partisans can generally be expected to view their own party's chances of success more optimistically, and
- The Republican Party controlled the Michigan legislature and therefore Republican insiders may have had more accurate information about the likelihood of specific legislation passing.

Interestingly, although respondents with more political knowledge were more accurate in their predictions of state legislation passing, the most politically knowledgeable respondents were actually the *least* accurate in their predictions of president election outcomes. This may have been a product of their attention to and trust in the prominent analysts and state polls that showed Clinton with a strong chance of victory.

Figure A3, below, shows the distribution of *how many* correct predictions each respondent made, out of the six outcomes listed in Table A7. The vast majority of respondents (89 percent) predicted only two or fewer outcomes correctly, most of which were one or both of the legislation outcomes. Less than six percent accurately predicted at least four out of the six outcomes, and none predicted all six correctly.

Figure A3. Histogram of Number of Correct Predictions about 2016 Political Outcomes



Section AE. Political Issue Attitudes – Supplemental Analyses

Insiders were asked to assess the effectiveness of Michigan's Emergency Manager law, both “at restoring fiscal health in the short-term (i.e., balancing the books)” and “at establishing sustainable financial conditions for the long term.” The distribution of responses to these questions are shown below, in Tables A8 and A9, respectively.

Table A8. Perceptions of Emergency Manager Law's Short Term Effectiveness, by Party ID

Demographic Characteristics	Very Effective (5)	Somewhat Effective (4)	Neither (3)	Somewhat Ineffective (2)	Very Ineffective (1)	Mean ^b	n
Overall	18%	55%	5%	15%	7%	3.61	401
Party Identification^a							
Republican	32%	57%	5%	5%	0%	4.16	128
Independent	17%	60%	4%	16%	5%	3.68	109
Democrat	7%	51%	3%	24%	15%	3.11	136

^a Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.
^b Means were calculated using the five-point scale listed in parentheses, where 5 = “Very Effective” and 1 = “Very Ineffective”

Table A8 shows that:

- Insiders expressed a generally positive perception of the Emergency Manager law's short-term effectiveness, with 73 percent rating it either Somewhat Effective or Very Effective, compared to just 22 percent who rated it Somewhat Ineffective or Very Ineffective.
- Republicans were more likely than Democrats to rate the law's short-term effects positively, yet even a majority (58 percent) of Democrats in the sample rated it Somewhat Effective or better.

Table A9. Perceptions of Emergency Manager Law's Long Term Effectiveness, by Party ID

Demographic Characteristics	Very Effective (5)	Somewhat Effective (4)	Neither (3)	Somewhat Ineffective (2)	Very Ineffective (1)	Mean ^b	n
Overall	4%	36%	15%	30%	15%	2.83	401
Party Identification^a							
Republican	7%	59%	16%	15%	4%	3.50	128
Independent	4%	35%	15%	36%	11%	2.84	109
Democrat	0%	17%	15%	40%	29%	2.20	136

^a Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.
^b Means were calculated using the five-point scale listed in parentheses, where 5 = “Very Effective” and 1 = “Very Ineffective”

Table A9 shows that:

- Insiders expressed mixed-to-negative opinions about the Emergency Manager law's long-term effectiveness, with 40 percent rating it Somewhat Effective or Very Effective and 45 percent rating it Somewhat Ineffective or Very Ineffective.
- Perceptions of the law's long-term effects were divided starkly on partisan lines, with 69 percent of Democrats rating it Somewhat Ineffective or worse, compared to just 19 percent of Republicans. Respondents who identified as Independent were somewhat more negative than positive in their assessment, with 47 percent rating it Somewhat Ineffective or worse.

Respondents' opinions in certain specific policy areas were measured by asking them to place themselves on a seven-point scale where the ends of the spectrum corresponded to either more liberal or more conservative attitudes on the issue.

Table A10, below, shows the average respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale measuring attitudes toward government services, where Point 1 corresponds to favoring fewer government services to reduce spending and Point 7 corresponds to favoring more government services. Means are also shown for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in the sample. The results indicate a strong partisan divide, with Democratic insiders favoring more services and Republican insiders favoring fewer services.

Table A10. Mean Policy Attitudes about Government Services, by Political Party

Demographic Characteristics	Mean^a	n
Overall	4.28	401
Party Identification^b Republican	3.16	129
Independent	4.10	108
Democrat	5.43	136

^a Means were calculated using a 7-point scale where higher values indicate stronger support for increasing government services

^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Table A11, below, shows the average respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale measuring attitudes toward regulating business to protect the environment, where Point 1 corresponds to favoring fewer environmental regulations and Point 7 corresponds to favoring more regulations. Means are also shown for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in the sample. Again, the results indicate a strong partisan divide, with Democratic insiders favoring more regulation and Republican insiders favoring less regulation.

Table A11. Mean Policy Attitudes about Environmental Regulations, by Political Party

Demographic Characteristics	Mean^a	n
Overall	4.62	401
Party Identification^b Republican	3.42	129
Independent	4.58	109
Democrat	5.70	135

^a Means were calculated using a 7-point scale where higher values indicate support for more government regulations

^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Respondents' attitudes toward police officers were also measured using a pair of items that were combined to create a nine-point scale (see the discussion of Figure 3 in the main report for details), where higher values indicate more positivity toward police and lower values indicate more negativity.

Below, Table A12 shows the average respondent's score on this nine-point scale as well as means for various subgroups of the sample based on party identification, race or ethnicity, and Openness to Social Change (see the discussion of Figure 4 in the main report for more details about Openness to Social Change).

The results in the table show that Michigan policy insiders expressed generally centrist attitudes toward police officers, with some important differences across particular subgroups. Namely:

- Democratic insiders, on average, held more pro-police attitudes than Republican insiders;
- Respondents who identified themselves as white or caucasian only expressed more positive attitudes toward police than those who identified with at least one racial or ethnic minority group; and
- Respondents who indicated they were more open and accepting of social change also expressed, on average, more positive attitudes toward police officers than did those who were more averse to change.

Table A12. Mean “Attitudes Towards Police” Score, by Demographic Characteristics

Demographic Characteristics		Mean ^a	n
Overall		5.49	398
Party Identification^b	Republican	5.35	127
	Independent	5.44	108
	Democrat	5.68	135
Race/Ethnicity	White/Caucasian Only	5.53	347
	Racial/Ethnic Minority	5.15	41
Openness to Change^c	High (6 - 9)	5.68	276
	Medium (5)	5.23	77
	Low (1 - 4)	4.71	42
^a Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police			
^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.			

Respondents' openness to compromise was measured using a pair of survey items which asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

Openness to other people’s views and willingness to compromise are important for politics in a country like ours.

What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out one’s principles.

Once again, the responses to each item ranged from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree on a five-point scale, and these responses were combined to create a single nine-point Openness to Social Change scale, where lower values correspond to more negative opinions toward compromise (i.e., that compromise is *not* important and is really just selling out one's principles) and higher values correspond to more positive opinions toward compromise (i.e., that compromise is important and is *not* really just selling out one's principles). The distribution of scores on this scale is shown below, in Figure A4.

Figure A4. Histogram of Openness to Compromise, Among Michigan Policy Insiders




Figure A4 illustrates that MPIP Round 2 respondents expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward compromise, with over half (54 percent) falling at Point 9 on the scale, corresponding to the greatest possible level of openness to compromise. An overwhelming 94 percent fall at Point 6 or above, while less than three percent fell at Point 4 or below.

Finally, respondents' openness to social change and compromise were measured using a pair of nine-point scales constructed from two survey items each (see the discussion in Section D of the main report for details). Tables A13 and A14, respectively, show the average respondent scores on each these scales, along with means for those identifying as Republican, Democrat, and Independent.

Table A13 indicates that, on average, respondents expressed centrist-to-positive attitudes toward social change, and that Democrats expressed more openness to change than Republicans or independents.

Table A13. Mean “Openness to Change” Score, by Political Party

Demographic Characteristics		Mean ^a	<i>n</i>
Overall		6.02	395
Party Identification^b	Republican	5.87	126
	Independent	5.94	106
	Democrat	6.22	135

^a Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate greater openness to social change

^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Table A14 indicates that, on average, respondents expressed very positive attitudes toward compromise, and that Democrats expressed even more openness to compromise than Republicans or independents.

Table A14. Mean “Openness to Compromise” Score, by Political Party

Demographic Characteristics		Mean ^a	<i>n</i>
<i>Overall</i>		8.08	397
Party Identification^b			
Republican		7.67	127
Independent		8.20	108
Democrat		8.34	134

^a Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate greater openness to compromise

^b Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.