

# Michigan Policy Insiders Panel (MPIP) Brief Report - Round 2

Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, IPPSR  
Michigan State University

Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, CLOSUP  
University of Michigan

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**MICHIGAN STATE**  
UNIVERSITY

Institute for Public Policy  
and Social Research  
Office for Survey Research



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## Overview

The Michigan Policy Insiders Panel (MPIP) is a project of Michigan State University's Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, conducted in conjunction with the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at the University of Michigan. The goal is to understand how policymakers learn about state problems, develop political influence, and interact to produce policy solutions.

The Round 2 survey was fielded from October 19, 2016 to November 1, 2016. Email invitations were sent to 537 MPIP panel members on October 19, and reminder emails were sent on October 24, October 27, and October 31 to those who had not yet completed the survey by the time of the reminder. During this time, 424 respondents access the survey (79.0 percent of the panelists) and 402 completed the survey. Of the 424 who accessed the survey, 94.8 completed it. The overall completion rate for the study is 74.9 percent<sup>1</sup>.

This report includes highlighted results from our Round 2 survey. Additional results and analyses are included in the appendix.

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<sup>1</sup> The formula for calculating response rates is Completed Interviews (CI) divided by the sum of Completed Interviews (CI), Respondent Refusals (R), and Non Interviews (NI) minus Ineligible Respondents (IE) (respondents who after selection into the sample are determined not to meet study criteria). No one was eliminated from the denominator due to being ineligible for the study. The response rate for this study is calculated as 402 / 537.

## Section A. 2016 Presidential Election

Below, Table 1 summarizes the 2016 presidential election vote preferences among MPIP Round 2 respondents when presented only with a choice between the two major party candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. The results are shown both overall and broken down by party identification, gender, and education level.

**Table 1. Presidential Vote Preference, by Demographic Characteristic**

Demographic Characteristics		Donald Trump	Hillary Clinton	No Preference Between These	<i>n</i>
<b>Overall</b>		18%	63%	20%	393
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	41%	21%	38%	125
	Independent	15%	62%	23%	107
	Democrat	0%	100%	0%	135
<b>Gender</b>	Female	11%	79%	10%	140
	Male	22%	54%	25%	245
<b>Education</b>	No 4-Yr Degree	50%	33%	17%	12
	4-Yr Degree	19%	59%	22%	178
	Graduate Degree	15%	68%	17%	196

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

In general, Table 1 indicates that a wide majority (63 percent) of the insiders in the panel expressed a preference for Hillary Clinton as president, compared to less than one-fifth (18 percent) who said they preferred Donald Trump. Moreover, the results show that:

- Although Democrats generally preferred Clinton and Republicans generally preferred Trump, the Democrats in the sample were far more strongly united behind Clinton (100 percent support) than the Republicans in the sample were united behind Trump (41 percent support). Those who identified themselves as Independent also preferred Clinton by a wide margin (62 percent to 15 percent).
- Men (22 percent) in the sample were about twice as likely as women (11 percent) to express a preference for Donald Trump as president.
- Consistent with a popular narrative about the 2016 election as a whole, support for Hillary Clinton increased with higher levels of formal education. In fact, among those with less than a four-year college degree, Donald Trump enjoyed 50 percent support compared to just 33 percent for Clinton. However, just 12 MPIP respondents fell into this education category, which reflects the “elite” insider status of the MPIP panel, in contrast to the general population where possessing less formal education is significantly more commonplace.

Even individuals with very strong opinions about what they would like to see happen may have expectations about the outcome of the election that differ starkly from their own preferences. Therefore, MPIP panelists were asked not only which candidate they preferred as president, but also who they expected to win the election. The results of this latter question are displayed below, in Table 2.

**Table 2. Expected Presidential Winner, by Party Identification**

Demographic Characteristics		Donald Trump	Hillary Clinton	<i>n</i>
<b>Overall</b>		8%	92%	402
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	16%	85%	129
	Independent	6%	95%	109
	Democrat	1%	99%	136

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Like most experts and analysts, the vast majority of MPIP panelists went into the 2016 election expecting a Clinton victory, with 92 percent saying they thought Hillary Clinton would win compared to just 8 percent who said they thought Donald Trump would win. Republicans were significantly more likely than Independents and Democrats to predict a win for Trump, but even so they were collectively quite pessimistic about his chances of winning the presidency. Only about 16 percent of Republican respondents correctly predicted that Donald Trump would win the presidency, compared to just 6 percent of Independents and 1 percent of Democrats.

### Section B. Political Issue Attitudes

Insiders were also asked about their opinions on certain public policy areas – namely their attitudes toward government services, regulating businesses to protect the environment, and policing.

These questions were similar to those appearing on either the Michigan State University State of the State Survey, also known as SOSS (which is representative of the general adult population of Michigan); or the University of Michigan's American National Election Studies, also known as ANES (which is representative of the general adult population of the United States). Comparisons to these general populations are shown side-by-side with the results in the following figures.

Specifically, the question about government services asked:

*Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at Point 1. Other people think it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at Point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?*

Based on this question wording, possible answers ranged from 1 to 7 where lower values correspond to more conservative positions (i.e., a preference for fewer government services) and higher values correspond to more liberal positions (i.e., a preference for more government services).

The distribution of responses to this question is shown below in Figure 1, along with a comparison to the general United States population as estimated using data from the ANES.

**Figure 1. Histogram of Policy Attitudes about Government Services, with Comparison to ANES**




Figure 1 illustrates that:

- Even though the Round 2 sample included a roughly equal proportion of self-identified Democrats and Republicans, about half of MPIP respondents (49 percent) placed themselves at Point 5 or higher on the Government Services scale, indicating at least some preference for more government services even if it means an increase in spending. By contrast, just 31 percent placed themselves at Point 3 or lower, indicating a preference for fewer services in order to reduce spending.
- On average, Michigan political insiders in the MPIP panel expressed a stronger preference for more government services than did the general US population.
- At the same time, the MPIP panel was also less polarized on this question than the US general population, with a smaller proportion of respondents selecting the most extreme answer choices on either end of the spectrum.

Next, the question about environmental regulation of businesses specifically asked:

*Some people think the government needs to regulate business to protect the environment. They think that efforts to protect the environment will create jobs. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at Point 1. Others think that the government should not regulate business to protect the environment. They think this regulation will not do much to help the environment and will cost us jobs. Suppose these people are at the other end, at Point 7. Again, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would place yourself on this scale?*

As before, the possible answers ranged from 1 to 7, but for ease of interpretation and comparison to other questions, the responses were re-coded such that lower values would again correspond to more conservative positions (i.e., a preference for less regulation) and higher values correspond to more liberal positions (i.e., a preference for more regulation). The distribution of responses to this question is shown below in Figure 2, along with a comparison to the general United States population as estimated using data from the ANES.

The distribution of responses to this question is shown below in Figure 2, along with a comparison to the general United States population as estimated using data from the ANES.

**Figure 2. Histogram of Policy Attitudes about Environmental Regulation, with Comparison to ANES**




Figure 2 illustrates that:

- Over half of MPIP respondents (54 percent) placed themselves at Point 5 or higher on the Government Services scale (indicating at least some preference for more government regulation in order to protect the environment), versus 29 percent who placed themselves at Point 3 or lower (indicating a preference for fewer services in order to reduce spending).
- On average, Michigan political insiders in the MPIP panel expressed a *much stronger preference for environmental regulation* than did the general US population. Over one-third of Michigan insiders (37 percent) placed themselves at Point 6 or higher on the scale, compared to less than 14 percent of the general US population.

Finally, respondents' attitudes toward police were measured using a pair of survey items which asked them to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following statements:

*Media and public attention make it too hard for police officers to do their jobs*

*Police officers often use too much force in carrying out their duties.*

Responses to each question ranged from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree on a five-point scale. These items were then combined to create a single nine-point Police Attitudes scale, where lower values correspond to more negative opinions toward police (i.e., that police use too much force and that the media do *not* make it too hard for them to do their jobs) and higher values correspond to more positive opinions toward police (i.e., that police do *not* use too much force and the media make it too hard for them to do their jobs).

The distribution of responses to this question is shown below in Figure 3, along with a comparison to the general Michigan population as estimated using data from SOSS.

**Figure 3. Histogram of Attitudes Toward Police, with Comparison to SOSS**




Figure 3 shows that:

- Michigan policy insiders expressed relatively centrist attitudes toward police officers, with nearly three-fourths (73 percent) falling at one of the middle three values (Points 4, 5, or 6) on the scale.
- On average, the attitudes expressed by the panel of insiders were more positive than negative toward police, with 48 percent falling at Point 6 or above on the scale and just 18 percent falling at Point 4 or below.
- Although the mean score among MPIP panelists on the nine-point scale (5.49) was nearly identical to the mean score among SOSS respondents (5.44), the MPIP panel was much *less polarized* on this topic than the Michigan general population, with a far smaller proportion of respondents falling at the extreme ends of the spectrum.

Lastly, insiders were asked about their attitudes toward social change in general. The questions were similar to those appearing on Michigan State University's State of the State Survey, which allows for side-by-side comparisons to the general population of Michigan adults. Openness to social change was measured using a pair of survey items which asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

*Our country is changing too fast, undermining traditional American values.*

*By accepting diverse cultures and lifestyles, our country is steadily improving.*

Responses to each item ranged from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree on a five-point scale. These items were then combined to create a single nine-point Openness to Social Change scale, where lower values correspond to more negative opinions toward social change (i.e., that the country is changing too fast and that the country is *not* improving by accepting diverse cultures) and higher values correspond to more positive opinions toward social change (i.e., that the country is *not* changing too fast and that the country is improving by accepting diverse cultures).



The distribution of responses to this question is shown below in Figure 4, along with a comparison to the general Michigan population as estimated using data from SOSS.

**Figure 4. Histogram of Openness to Social Change, with Comparison to SOSS**




Figure 4 shows that:

- Michigan policy insiders expressed relatively centrist attitudes toward social change, with nearly two-thirds (66 percent) falling at one of the middle three values (Points 4, 5, or 6) on the scale.
- On average, the attitudes expressed by the panel of insiders were more positive than negative social change by a wide margin, with 70 percent falling at Point 6 or above on the scale and just 11 percent falling at Point 4 or below.
- The mean score among MPIP panelists on the nine-point scale (6.02) was somewhat more positive toward social change than the mean score among SOSS respondents (5.44).
- The MPIP panel was also much *less polarized* on this topic than the Michigan general population, with a far smaller proportion of respondents falling at the extreme ends of the spectrum.

### Section C. Political Party Advantages

Respondents were also given a series of items to measure perceptions of the particular advantages of each political party. Specifically, the survey asked:

*Regardless of which political party you normally support, which political party do you think is better at each of the following?*

*Speaking up for disadvantaged groups in our society*

*Speaking up for American principles and values*

*Proposing specific policies that respond to new social problems*

*Ensuring that government stays in its proper role in our society*

Figure 5, below, shows the distribution of responses to all four of these items, along with side-by-side comparisons to the perceptions of the general adult population of Michigan, as measured by MSU's State of the State Survey.

NOTE: The MPIP online questionnaire specifically listed “Equally Good or Equally Not Good” as an answer choice, whereas the SOSS telephone instrument did not explicitly list this option and instead required respondents to offer that answer on their own. Therefore, the results of these questions may not be perfectly comparable across these two surveys.

**Figure 5. Perceived Political Party Advantages, with Comparison to SOSS**




Figure 5 suggests that MPIP respondents:

- Rated the *Democratic Party* as the better party at speaking up for disadvantaged groups,
- Rated the *Republican Party* as the better party at keeping government in its proper role,
- Rated the two parties about evenly at speaking up for American principles and values, and
- Collectively indicated a much clearer advantage for one party over the other in three out of the four areas than did members of the general population. This may be a product of the aforementioned difference in question wording, and/or because the insiders were more aware or more willing than the mass public to acknowledge the strengths of the party they do not normally support.

Table 3, below, summarizes the responses to these same party advantage questions for insiders with different partisan affiliations. The results generally suggest that respondents' personal party identification is correlated with their perceptions of which party is better in each area, yet in a few particular cases, partisans from both sides actually agree on which party has the advantage.

**Table 3. Perceived Best Party at Speaking up for Disadvantaged Groups, by Political Party**

Demographic Characteristics		Republican Party	Equal	Democratic Party	<i>n</i>
<i>Which political party is better at speaking up for disadvantaged groups in society?</i>					
<b>Overall</b>		3%	14%	83%	402
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	8%	23%	69%	129
	Independent	1%	14%	85%	109
	Democrat	0%	3%	97%	136
<i>Which political party is better at speaking up for American principles and values?</i>					
<b>Overall</b>		32%	39%	29%	402
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	65%	33%	2%	129
	Independent	29%	46%	25%	109
	Democrat	3%	40%	57%	136
<i>Which political party is better at proposing policies that respond to new social problems?</i>					
<b>Overall</b>		8%	31%	61%	402
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	17%	48%	35%	129
	Independent	6%	31%	63%	109
	Democrat	1%	14%	85%	136
<i>Which political party is better at ensuring government stays in its proper role in society?</i>					
<b>Overall</b>		46%	40%	15%	402
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	84%	16%	1%	129
	Independent	40%	50%	9%	109
	Democrat	16%	52%	32%	136
<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.					

Additional results and methodological details are available in the appendix to this short report. A full report will eventually be publicly available at [ippsr.msu.edu](http://ippsr.msu.edu).

# Michigan Policy Insiders Panel (MPIP) Report Appendix - Round 2

Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, IPPSR  
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**M** | Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy  
University of Michigan

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## Section AA. Demographic Summary

Table A1 provides a breakdown of the demographic characteristics of the political insiders who responded to each of the first two rounds of the Michigan Political Insiders Panel survey. In addition, it includes a comparison to results from the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR)'s State of the State Survey, which is representative of the general adult population of Michigan.

**Table A1. Demographic Breakdown of MPIP Panel, by Round**

Demographic Characteristics		MPIP <sup>a</sup> Round 1	MPIP <sup>a</sup> Round 2	SOSS <sup>a</sup> (General MI Population)
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b>	Republican	33%	35%	29%
	Independent	30%	29%	34%
	Democrat	37%	36%	37%
<b>Ideology</b>	Conservative	16%	16%	40%
	In the Middle	61%	62%	36%
	Liberal	23%	22%	24%
<b>Race/Ethnicity<sup>c</sup></b>	White	90%	92%	78%
	Black	8%	6%	12%
	Hispanic	2%	1%	4%
<b>Gender</b>	Male	62%	64%	49%
	Female	38%	36%	51%
<b>Ideology</b>	No 4-Yr Degree	4%	3%	61%
	4-Yr Degree	44%	47%	24%
	Graduate Degree	53%	50%	15%
<b><i>n</i></b>		526	402	995

<sup>a</sup> MPIP percentages are unweighted from a non-probability sample; SOSS percentages use survey weights.

<sup>b</sup> Third party identifiers were excluded from Party ID percentages only.

<sup>c</sup> Racial/ethnic categories were not mutually exclusive; respondents could select as many as applied to them.

The demographic breakdown of MPIP respondents was very similar across both rounds of data collection, although Round 2 respondents were on average *slightly more likely* to be white, male, and Republican than Round 1 respondents.

Compared to the SOSS estimates of the general Michigan population, members of both rounds of the Michigan Political Insiders Panel were, on average:

- *More likely* to identify as Republican and *less likely* to identify as Independent,
- *More likely* to identify as “In the Middle” ideologically and *less likely* to identify as Conservative,
- *More likely* to identify themselves as White / Caucasian, and
- *More likely* to identify themselves as Male.
- *More likely* to have a college degree, and *more likely* to have a graduate degree.

**Section AB. Social Identity of Partisanship and Ideology**

The “social identity” aspect of partisanship and ideology refers to the convergence between an individual’s partisan and social identities – that is, the extent to which they identify with a particular party or ideology as a social group. The MPIP Round 2 survey measured the strength of these identities for self-identified partisans and ideologues using three questions apiece for partisanship and ideology. These questions asked:

- How well the term [Democrat / Republican / Liberal / Conservative] describes them,
- How often they use “we” instead of “they” when talking about [Democrats / Republicans / Liberals / Conservatives], and
- How important, if at all, being a [Democrat / Republican / Liberal / Conservative] is to them.

For both partisanship and ideology, these three items were combined into 12-point indexes measuring strength of socio-partisan identity and strength of socio-ideological identity. The distribution of these scales are summarized in this section.

Below, Figure A1 illustrates that respondents generally expressed, on average, a moderately strong socio-partisan identity with their preferred political party, with most respondents falling near the center of the scale.

**Figure A1. Histogram of Socio-Partisan Identity (Among Partisan Identifiers)**




Table A2 shows the average score on the socio-partisan identity scale separately for self-identified Republicans and Democrats. The results indicate that Democrats who responded to the MPIP Round 2 survey identify more strongly with their party as a social group than did Republicans.

**Table A2. Mean “Socio-Partisan Identity” Score, by Political Party**

Demographic Characteristics		Mean <sup>a</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>		6.35	338
<hr/>			
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b>	Republican	6.75	126
	Democrat	7.20	133
<hr/>			
<i><sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police</i>			
<i><sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents and therefore excluded from this table, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.</i>			

Below, Figure A2 illustrates that respondents generally expressed, on average, a moderately strong socio-ideological identity with their preferred ideology, with most respondents falling near the center of the scale.

**Figure A2. Histogram of Socio-Ideological Identity (Among Ideological Identifiers)**






Table A3 shows the average score on the socio-partisan identity scale separately for self-identified Republicans and Democrats. The results indicate that Conservatives who responded to the MPIP Round 2 survey identify more strongly with their ideology as a social group than did Liberals.

**Table A3. Mean “Socio-Ideological Identity” Score, by Demographic Characteristics**

Demographic Characteristics		Mean <sup>a</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>		7.36	239
<b>Ideology<sup>b</sup></b>	Conservative	7.51	95
	Liberal	7.24	138
<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police			
<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.			

### Section AC. 2016 United States Presidential Election – Supplemental Analyses

The MPIP surveys included a number of questions which can be used to evaluate common hypotheses and popular narratives about the 2016 presidential election and Donald Trump's victory, which came as a surprise to many pundits.

Table A4, below, indicates that among the political insiders in the MPIP panel, those who supported either major contender in the Democratic primaries (i.e., Clinton or Bernie Sanders) overwhelmingly preferred Clinton in the general election. However, insiders who supported any Republican candidate besides Trump in the Republican primaries were far more split between Clinton and Trump in the general election.

Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by disgruntled Sanders supporters abandoning her in November. However, it must be noted that the MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

**Table A4. General Election Vote Preference, by Candidate Supported in Primary Elections**

<u>Supported in Primaries</u>	<u>General Election Support</u>			n
	Clinton	Trump	No preference	
Hillary Clinton	100%	0%	0%	108
Bernie Sanders	95%	2%	4%	55
Donald Trump	9%	82%	9%	11
John Kasich	38%	23%	39%	122
Other Republican	25%	42%	33%	69
None of the above	77%	12%	12%	26
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>391</b>

Below, Table A5 shows that among Michigan political insiders, support for major third-party presidential candidates Gary Johnson and Jill Stein came exclusively from Republicans and Independents, very few of whom indicated a preference for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump if they had only those two choices.

Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by a “spoiler effect” where third party candidates stole away votes that would otherwise have gone to her. Again, though, it must be noted that MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

**Table A5. Support for Third-Party Candidates, by Party and Major Candidate Preference**

Demographic Characteristics		Gary Johnson	Jill Stein	<i>n</i>
<b>Overall</b>		11%	1%	393
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	18%	1%	124
	Independent	17%	3%	107
	Democrat	0%	0%	135
<b>Major Party Candidate Preference</b>	Trump	4%	3%	70
	Clinton	5%	0%	246
	No Preference	38%	1%	76

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Finally, Table A6 below shows that Democrats and Clinton supporters who answered the MPIP survey were more likely than Republicans and Trump supporters to say they would “definitely” vote in the general election. Therefore, we show little to no evidence *within this sample* that Clinton was greatly harmed by an “enthusiasm gap” where her supporters were less passionate about the race and therefore less likely to turn out than Trump’s supporters. Once again, MPIP panelists are not representative of Michigan voters as a whole.

**Table A6. Likelihood of Voting in Presidential Election, by Party and Major Candidate Preference**

Demographic Characteristics		Will “Definitely” Vote	Less Than “Definitely”	<i>n</i>
<b>Overall</b>		90%	10%	397
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	81%	19%	127
	Independent	92%	8%	108
	Democrat	100%	0%	134
<b>Major Party Candidate Preference</b>	Trump	94%	6%	70
	Clinton	96%	4%	245
	No Preference	70%	30%	77

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

### Section AD. Accuracy of 2016 Political Predictions

In addition to questions about their personal preferences, MPIP panelists were also asked to predict a number of 2016 political outcomes. Many pundits and analysts notoriously failed to predict several of these outcomes, and the results of MPIP Round 2 suggest that Michigan’s political insiders did not fare much better.

Tables A7 and A8, below, show the percentage of respondents from each political party and with various levels of political knowledge (as estimated using the number of correct responses to a number of Michigan political

knowledge questions administered in MPIP Round 1) who correctly predicted each of twelve different political outcomes from 2016. Table A7 summarizes the accuracy of panelists' predictions about the 2016 elections, while Table A8 summarizes the accuracy of predictions about bills on particular policy topics passing (or not passing) both chambers of the Michigan legislature.

**Table A7. Percentage of Respondents who Correctly Predicted Certain 2016 Election Outcomes**

Demographic Characteristics		Election Topics			
		Michigan House (GOP Seats) <sup>a</sup>	Pres. Election (Winner)	Pres. Election (MI Winner)	Pres. Election (Clinton EVs) <sup>b</sup>
<b>Actual Outcome</b>		<b>63</b>	<b>Trump</b>	<b>Trump</b>	<b>232 or 227<sup>b</sup></b>
<b>Percent Correctly Predicted<sup>c</sup></b>					
<b>Overall</b>		14%	8%	7%	2%
<b>Party ID</b>	Republican	16%	16%	11%	4%
	Independent	18%	6%	6%	2%
	Democrat	7%	2%	2%	0%
<b>Political Knowledge<sup>d</sup></b>	High	10%	6%	3%	2%
	Medium	12%	11%	11%	2%
	Low	29%	7%	8%	0%

<sup>a</sup> Predictions of GOP seats in the Michigan House were scored as “correct” if they were within three seats (i.e., roughly three percent of the 110 total seats in the chamber) of the actual outcome, which was 63 GOP seats. In other words, predictions between 60 and 66 (inclusive) were coded as “correct.”

<sup>b</sup> Predictions of the electoral vote count for the presidential election were scored as “correct” if they were within 16 electoral votes (i.e., roughly three percent of the 538 total votes in the Electoral College) of the actual outcome. For the true outcome, we counted EITHER the total electoral votes controlled by the states (and districts in Maine) Hillary Clinton won (232), OR the number of votes received in the actual Electoral College after “faithless electors” voted for candidates other than Trump or Clinton (227). In other words, predictions between 211 and 248 (inclusive) Clinton votes were coded as “correct.”

<sup>c</sup> Percentages are out of the number of respondents who answered each individual question.

<sup>d</sup> Political knowledge was estimated for each respondent using the number of correct answers to a set of Michigan political knowledge questions administered in Round 1, which included identifying the names of both US Senators from Michigan, the number of justices on Michigan's Supreme Court, and the number of individuals in Michigan's state Senate.

Listed in order from most correctly predicted to least correctly predicted, the election outcomes included in Table A7 table are the number of Michigan House of Representatives seats held by the Republican Party after the elections, the winner of the presidential election overall, the winner of Michigan's electoral votes in the presidential election, and the number of electoral votes won by Hillary Clinton in the presidential election.

Fewer than one-sixth of Michigan insiders in the panel correctly predicted each of these outcomes, and only the predictions about state elections even exceeded 10 percent correct. Republican respondents were more likely than Democratic respondents to correctly predict each of the four outcomes. This may be because each of these outcomes would be considered successes for the Republican Party, and partisans can generally be expected to view their own party's chances of success more optimistically.

**Table A8. Percentage of Respondents who Correctly Predicted Certain 2016 Legislative Outcomes**

Demographic Characteristics		Legislation Topics							
		Prevailing Wage Law Changes	Autonomous Vehicles	Auto Insurance Changes	Energy Competition / Renewables	Mental Health Services	Emergency Manager Law	Criminal Justice Reform	FOIA Changes
Passed?		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
		Percent Correctly Predicted <sup>a</sup>							
<b>Overall</b>		72%	62%	56%	55%	54%	46%	43%	40%
<b>Party ID</b>	Republican	78%	69%	64%	62%	53%	47%	36%	48%
	Independent	73%	53%	59%	46%	50%	35%	47%	36%
	Democrat	68%	63%	50%	58%	60%	55%	44%	37%
<b>Political Knowledge<sup>d</sup></b>	High	76%	70%	63%	61%	55%	49%	41%	46%
	Medium	72%	58%	53%	50%	53%	50%	42%	36%
	Low	65%	45%	42%	44%	51%	31%	49%	32%

<sup>a</sup> Legislation predictions were scored "Correct" if the respondent indicated that the actual outcome was either very likely or somewhat likely to occur. For instance, if the legislation did NOT actually pass during the legislative session, predictions that it was "Very Unlikely" or "Somewhat Unlikely" to pass were scored as "Correct."


Listed in order from most correctly predicted to least correctly predicted, the legislative outcomes included in the table are changes to prevailing wage laws, autonomous vehicles, auto insurance changes, energy competition or renewables, mental health services, parole or criminal justice reform, the emergency manager law, and Freedom of Information Act changes. Among these policy areas, legislation was passed on the subjects of autonomous vehicles and energy competition between the time of the survey and the end of the 2016 legislative session; legislation did not pass on the rest of the topics during that time period.

Republican respondents were more likely than Democratic respondents to correctly predict five out of the eight outcomes, which may be a result of the fact that the Republican Party controlled the Michigan legislature and therefore Republican insiders may have had more accurate information about the likelihood of specific legislation passing.

Taking Tables A7 and A8 together, it is interesting to note that although respondents with more political knowledge were more accurate in their predictions of state legislation passing, the most politically knowledgeable respondents were actually the *least* accurate in their predictions of president election outcomes. This may have been a product of their attention to and trust in the prominent analysts and state polls that showed Clinton with a strong chance of victory.

Figure A3, below, shows the distribution of *how many* correct predictions each respondent made, out of the twelve outcomes listed in Tables A7 and A8. Only those who made predictions on all twelve questions are included. The vast majority of respondents (85 percent) predicted six or fewer outcomes correctly, most of which were the legislation outcomes. Less than three percent accurately predicted at least eight out of the six outcomes, and none predicted ten or more correctly.

**Figure A3. Histogram of Number of Correct Predictions about 2016 Political Outcomes**



**Section AE. Political Issue Attitudes – Supplemental Analyses**

Insiders were asked to assess the effectiveness of Michigan's Emergency Manager law, both “*at restoring fiscal health in the short-term (i.e., balancing the books)*” and “*at establishing sustainable financial conditions for the long term.*” The distribution of responses to these questions are shown below, in Tables A8 and A9, respectively.

**Table A9. Perceptions of Emergency Manager Law's Short Term Effectiveness, by Party ID**

Demographic Characteristics	Very Effective (5)	Somewhat Effective (4)	Neither (3)	Somewhat Ineffective (2)	Very Ineffective (1)	Mean <sup>b</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>	18%	55%	5%	15%	7%	3.61	401
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>							
Republican	32%	57%	5%	5%	0%	4.16	128
Independent	17%	60%	4%	16%	5%	3.68	109
Democrat	7%	51%	3%	24%	15%	3.11	136

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

<sup>b</sup> Means were calculated using the five-point scale listed in parentheses, where 5 = “Very Effective” and 1 = “Very Ineffective”

Table A9 shows that:

- Insiders expressed a generally positive perception of the Emergency Manager law's short-term effectiveness, with 73 percent rating it either Somewhat Effective or Very Effective, compared to just 22 percent who rated it Somewhat Ineffective or Very Ineffective.
- Republicans were more likely than Democrats to rate the law's short-term effects positively, yet even a majority (58 percent) of Democrats in the sample rated it Somewhat Effective or better.

**Table A10. Perceptions of Emergency Manager Law's *Long Term* Effectiveness, by Party ID**

Demographic Characteristics		Very Effective (5)	Somewhat Effective (4)	Neither (3)	Somewhat Ineffective (2)	Very Ineffective (1)	Mean <sup>b</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>		4%	36%	15%	30%	15%	2.83	401
<b>Party Identification<sup>a</sup></b>	Republican	7%	59%	16%	15%	4%	3.50	128
	Independent	4%	35%	15%	36%	11%	2.84	109
	Democrat	0%	17%	15%	40%	29%	2.20	136

<sup>a</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

<sup>b</sup> Means were calculated using the five-point scale listed in parentheses, where 5 = "Very Effective" and 1 = "Very Ineffective"

Table A10 shows that:

- Insiders expressed mixed-to-negative opinions about the Emergency Manager law's long-term effectiveness, with 40 percent rating it Somewhat Effective or Very Effective and 45 percent rating it Somewhat Ineffective or Very Ineffective.
- Perceptions of the law's long-term effects were divided starkly on partisan lines, with 69 percent of Democrats rating it Somewhat Ineffective or worse, compared to just 19 percent of Republicans. Respondents who identified as Independent were somewhat more negative than positive in their assessment, with 47 percent rating it Somewhat Ineffective or worse.

Respondents' opinions in certain specific policy areas were measured by asking them to place themselves on a seven-point scale where the ends of the spectrum corresponded to either more liberal or more conservative attitudes on the issue.

Table A11, below, shows the average respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale measuring attitudes toward government services, where Point 1 corresponds to favoring fewer government services to reduce spending and Point 7 corresponds to favoring more government services. Means are also shown for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in the sample. The results indicate a strong partisan divide, with Democratic insiders favoring more services and Republican insiders favoring fewer services.

**Table A11. Mean Policy Attitudes about Government Services, by Political Party**

Demographic Characteristics	Mean <sup>a</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>	4.28	401
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b> Republican	3.16	129
Independent	4.10	108
Democrat	5.43	136

<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 7-point scale where higher values indicate stronger support for increasing government services

<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Table A12 below, shows the average respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale measuring attitudes toward regulating business to protect the environment, where Point 1 corresponds to favoring fewer environmental regulations and Point 7 corresponds to favoring more regulations. Means are also shown for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in the sample. Again, the results indicate a strong partisan divide, with Democratic insiders favoring more regulation and Republican insiders favoring less regulation.

**Table A12. Mean Policy Attitudes about Environmental Regulations, by Political Party**

Demographic Characteristics	Mean <sup>a</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>	4.62	401
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b> Republican	3.42	129
Independent	4.58	109
Democrat	5.70	135

<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 7-point scale where higher values indicate support for more government regulations

<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Respondents' attitudes toward police officers were also measured using a pair of items that were combined to create a nine-point scale (see the discussion of Figure 3 in the main report for details), where higher values indicate more positivity toward police and lower values indicate more negativity.

Below, Table A13 shows the average respondent's score on this nine-point scale as well as means for various subgroups of the sample based on party identification, race or ethnicity, and Openness to Social Change (see the discussion of Figure 4 in the main report for more details about Openness to Social Change).

The results in the table show that Michigan policy insiders expressed generally centrist attitudes toward police officers, with some important differences across particular subgroups. Namely:

- Democratic insiders, on average, held more pro-police attitudes than Republican insiders;
- Respondents who identified themselves as white or caucasian only expressed more positive attitudes toward police than those who identified with at least one racial or ethnic minority group; and
- Respondents who indicated they were more open and accepting of social change also expressed, on average, more positive attitudes toward police officers than did those who were more averse to change.

**Table A13. Mean “Attitudes Towards Police” Score, by Demographic Characteristics**

Demographic Characteristics		Mean <sup>a</sup>	n
<b>Overall</b>		5.49	398
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b>	Republican	5.35	127
	Independent	5.44	108
	Democrat	5.68	135
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	White/Caucasian Only	5.53	347
	Racial/Ethnic Minority	5.15	41
<b>Openness to Change<sup>c</sup></b>	High (6 - 9)	5.68	276
	Medium (5)	5.23	77
	Low (1 - 4)	4.71	42
<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate more negativity toward police			
<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.			

Respondents' openness to compromise was measured using a pair of survey items which asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

*Openness to other people's views and willingness to compromise are important for politics in a country like ours.*


*What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out one's principles.*

Once again, the responses to each item ranged from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree on a five-point scale, and these responses were combined to create a single nine-point Openness to Social Change scale, where lower values correspond to more negative opinions toward compromise (i.e., that compromise is *not* important and is really just selling out one's principles) and higher values correspond to more positive opinions toward compromise (i.e., that compromise is important and is *not* really just selling out one's principles). The distribution of scores on this scale is shown below, in Figure A4.

Figure A4 illustrates that MPIP Round 2 respondents expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward compromise, with over half (54 percent) falling at Point 9 on the scale, corresponding to the greatest possible level of openness to compromise. An overwhelming 94 percent fall at Point 6 or above, while less than three percent fell at Point 4 or below.



**Figure A4. Histogram of Openness to Compromise, Among Michigan Policy Insiders**



Finally, respondents' openness to social change and compromise were measured using a pair of nine-point scales constructed from two survey items each (see the discussion in Section D of the main report for details). Tables A14 and A15, respectively, show the average respondent scores on each these scales, along with means for those identifying as Republican, Democrat, and Independent.

Table A14 indicates that, on average, respondents expressed centrist-to-positive attitudes toward social change, and that Democrats expressed more openness to change than Republicans or independents.

**Table A14. Mean “Openness to Change” Score, by Political Party**

Demographic Characteristics		Mean <sup>a</sup>	<i>n</i>
<b>Overall</b>		6.02	395
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b>			
	Republican	5.87	126
	Independent	5.94	106
	Democrat	6.22	135

<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate greater openness to social change

<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.

Table A15 indicates that, on average, respondents expressed very positive attitudes toward compromise, and that Democrats expressed even more openness to compromise than Republicans or independents.

**Table A15. Mean “Openness to Compromise” Score, by Political Party**

<b>Demographic Characteristics</b>		<b>Mean<sup>a</sup></b>	<b><i>n</i></b>
<i>Overall</i>		8.08	397
<hr/>			
<b>Party Identification<sup>b</sup></b>	Republican	7.67	127
	Independent	8.20	108
	Democrat	8.34	134

<sup>a</sup> Means were calculated using a 9-point scale where higher values indicate greater openness to compromise

<sup>b</sup> Respondents who identified themselves as independent are coded as independents, even if they also said they lean closer to one party.